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The Costs and Benefits of European Immigration
  In the early 21st century Europe is confronted with an ageing population, 
stagnating or even declining native populations, high unemployment and in 
the most key countries also with slow economic growth. At the same time 
Europe remains one of the prime destinations of international migration.
  Free movement of people is a means of creating an integrated Europe. 
Geographic mobility also helps on establishing a more efficient labour market, 
to the long-term benefit of workers, employers, taxpayers and EU Member 
States. Thus, our paper quantifies current migration patterns (see pp. 14-15); it 
recollects theoretical (see pp. 16-27) and empirical arguments (see pp. 28-47) on 
why immigration is so important, to what extent labour mobility allows indi-
viduals to improve their job prospects and employers to recruit people with ade-
quate skills. The paper also discusses what kind of common European policies 
should be undertaken to optimise benefits of international migration. All our 
findings might not only avail understanding the economic impact of immigra-
tion. But they have policy implications for migrant receiving countries in Eu-
rope as well. The aim is to develop a better understanding of how the EU and its 
Member States could use availability and skills of today’s and future immigrant 
populations in order to cope with economic and demographic challenges.
Demography and Ageing 
  Immigration has a positive influence on population and labour force 
growth. If natural population growth turns negative, immigration can help 
maintain total population and the labour force constant. Immigration could 
also be a remedy to shortages of labour and skills that are unrelated to demo-
graphic processes (see pp. 28-31). However, immigration is not a solution for 
tackling the consequences of demographic ageing in Europe. The level of net 
migration required to keep the old-age dependency ratio constant would en-
tail increases of inflows well beyond socially desirable and politically sustain-
able levels (see pp. 16; 30-31).
Labour Markets
  Empirical evidence shows that the impact on wages and employment is 
on average negative, but very small (see pp. 32-37). This suggests, that the po-
tential downward effect is offset by additional creation of employment due to 
economies of scale and spillovers (which increase productivity) as well as 
higher demand for goods and services (due to population growth through im-
migration; see pp. 16-20).
  Compared to the US, the immigration impact on wages and employment 
was found to be more negative in EU countries. However, this negative effect 
is not evenly distributed among EU Member States. In Greece, Italy, Spain and 
the UK it turned out to be negligible or slightly positive. Immigrants appar-
ently acted as complements to native workers and competition causing down-
ward pressure on wages and job displacement hardly arose (see pp. 32-37). For 
example, high-skilled immigrants filled in vacancies that went unmet by the 
native labour supply and thus increased productivity, while low-skilled mi-
grants took jobs avoided by natives (e.g. dirty, difficult and dangerous jobs, low 
paid household and other service jobs) and jobs in sectors that are tradi- 
tionally affected by strong seasonal fluctuations (e.g. farming, construction, 
and tourism).
  Negative effects are observed in the case of Belgium, where new immi-
grants competed with immigrants who had come during earlier periods for 
Executive 
Summary
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available low-skilled jobs, resulting in high unemployment rates among cer-
tain foreign-born groups (in particular immigrants from Congo, Morocco and 
Turkey). In Germany, due to the rigidity of the labour market and the com-
paratively low mobility of German workers, the labour market effects of im-
migration were found to be negative as well, in particular in the construction 
sector. This illustrates, that market regulations that have the scope to protect 
native workers often have an unintended consequence. In the long run they 
tend aggravating the negative impact of immigration on the labour market 
situation of the natives (see p. 36).
  With respect to labour market efficiency, empirical evidence from se- 
veral EU countries shows that it could be improved by immigration. Since im-
migrants move to the most attractive regions, where salaries and employment 
opportunities are higher, their labour market integration induces a conver-
gence effect on wages and unemployment between regions. While at the same 
time the labour market shortages are reduced (see pp. 20; 37-38).
Public Finances
  The implication of international migration on the welfare systems of EU 
Member States is diverse. Empirical evidence illustrates that the impact is 
strongly dependent upon the original “gate of entry” or way of admission, the 
labour market access and – as a result of the former – the socio-economic 
characteristics (labour market performance) of the immigrants.
  Countries with high share of economic migration – implying that im-
migrants have a speedier access to work (e.g. UK, Italy, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain) – experienced a positive contribution of immigrants to the treasury (see 
pp. 38-41).
  In countries where immigration flows were dominated by asylum- 
seekers (who are permitted to work under restrictive conditions) and families 
reuniting (e.g. Denmark, Sweden), immigrants were more dependent on wel-
fare payments than natives. The same occured in countries were immigrants 
had a low labour market performance (partly due to discrimination and inap-
propriate access to schooling and training; e.g. The Netherlands). Germany 
partly also falls into this category because of the large-scale admission of 
ethnic Germans and their dependent family members who are characterised 
by high unemployment and high take-up rates of state pensions (see p. 39).
  The lowest labour force participation registered in the EU-15 in 2003 was 
that of immigrant women of Turkish and North African nationality, illustrat-
ing that migrant women (in particular Muslim women) are more likely than 
men to remain outside the labour market, which makes it even more difficult 
for them to integrate into the receiving society (see p. 41).
Balance of Payments and International Competitiveness
  Immigration has a small but positive impact on trade relations between 
migrant receiving and migrant sending counties, as shown by empirical re-
sults from the UK and Spain (see pp. 42-43). Though, the overall effect on the 
balance of payments of the EU Member States is uncertain.
  Immigrants (in particular seasonal and temporary workers) remit a sig-
nificant part of their income to their relatives back home. The sum of remit-
tances‘ outflows from the 25 EU Member States equalled in 2004 the equiva-
lent of some US$ 49.7 billion. These capital flows represent undoubtedly a 
drain on the balance of payments, although, they might support EU exports of 
92006  |  Rainer Münz, Thomas Straubhaar, Florin Vadean, Nadia Vadean
The Costs and Benefits of European Immigration
goods and services too. The EU countries could improve their competitiveness 
relative to the migrant sending countries through the devaluation effect on 
the exchange rate and through the additional spending capacity generated in 
the migrant sending countries (see pp. 43-45).
  To our knowledge there is no literature on the impact of remittance out-
flows on the migrant receiving countries’ balance of payments and their 
international competitiveness. The direction and size of the effect remains to 
be explored.
Growth
  The influence of immigration on growth was found to be positive in the 
case of immigrants endowed with financial or human capital. Immigrants 
that provide financial capital have a positive effect on consumption and in-
vestments and high-skilled professionals are complementary to investment 
flows in the sectors they are employed in and thus attract more investments 
(see pp. 45-47). Only the low-skilled migrants were estimated to reduce labour 
productivity in sectors that are employing them. However, low-skilled mi-
grants are mostly taking jobs avoided by natives and in sectors with seasonal 
labour shortages (e.g. farming, road repairs and construction, tourism-related 
services). In particular in Southern European countries, which have market 
shortages for low-skilled labour, they not only helped these sectors to survive, 
but also contributed to their development (see p. 47).
  Similar to the case of welfare systems, the impact of immigration on 
growth strongly depends on the labour market performance of the migrants. 
Several European countries experienced high skilled migrants being employed 
in low skilled jobs. This so called brain waste generates resource costs and 
alerts the questions about recognition of diplomas, assimilation and integra-
tion in the migrant receiving economy. Labour market integration often does 
not occur due to a combination of rigid labour markets, the reciprocal link be-
tween low labour market status and relatively poor school performance, and 
to some extent also because of labour market discrimination against non- 
European immigrants. Discrimination not only hinders labour market perfor-
mance of immigrants, but by decreasing returns to human capital lowers their 
incentive to invest in host-country-specific human capital, which in turn cau-
ses poorer labour market performance (see p. 47).
Conclusions for a European Migration and Integration Policy Approach
  Maximising benefits and minimising costs of immigration means:
–  EU Member States need to set-up flexible and market oriented admission 
systems that help ease labour market bottlenecks and long-term deficits at all 
qualification levels – from unskilled workers to highly skilled professionals. 
Attracting highly skilled migrants will be of particular importance as demon-
strated by recent legislative changes in France and the UK.
–  EU Member States ought to try attracting more high skilled migrants by 
granting long-term residence permits, facilitating access to the whole EU la-
bour market, improving the recognition of degrees, qualification and profes-
sional skills, increasing investment in R&D and better disseminating infor-
mation in the migrant source countries about the conditions of admission and 
rights granted to newcomers.
–  Non-economic migrants (reuniting family members, recognized refugees 
and quota refugees) should be granted speedy access to the labour market. 
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More emphasis should be given on the recognition of degrees and qualifica-
tions acquired of these non-economic migrants prior to immigration.
–  Foreign nationals with refugee status as well as asylum seekers tolerated to 
stay for an undefined period of time need to be allowed and encouraged to 
accept jobs and to seek work at their qualification level.
–  Asylum seekers should be given preferential access to temporary or sea-
sonal employment.
–  EU Member States ought to continue the efforts addressing the challenges 
of migrants‘ integration (in particular of non-economic migrants) and help 
improving the labour market performance of migrants by ensuring the recog-
nition of qualifications, fighting against discrimination and racism, providing 
language training and assuring affordable housing.
–  Social and labour market inclusion of migrant women should be actively 
promoted.
–  Labour markets should be granted a higher degree of flexibility in order to 
make sure that growing sectors take advantage of increased productivity and 
contribute to job creation. Under certain circumstances assuring a given level 
of income for workers by wage subsidies may be considered.
–  Certain immigrants may be temporarily excluded from a particular range 
of welfare benefits to prevent the EU Member States from acting as welfare 
magnets.
–  EU Member States have to consider promoting circulation of high-skilled 
migrants by facilitating dual-citizenship and improving portability of 
acquired rights and claims towards welfare systems of EU Member States.
  Special attention should be given to the integration of children with mi-
grant background (the so-called second generation). This is crucial with regard 
to the aim of maximising economic benefits and reducing costs of immigra-
tion. If EU Member States are able to integrate well second generation migrants, 
positive economic and fiscal contributions could be increased. If failing to do 
so, they have to carry the financial burden of higher unemployment and 
lower economic success of people with migration background. As empirical 
evidence makes clear, language proficiency and education are key elements 
that decide about success or failure of immigrants and their children. With 
regard to the conditions of an efficient migration policy this means:
–  Promoting school education, job training and higher education for immi-
grants – in particular for those from middle and low-income countries.
–  Promoting school education, job training and higher education among chil-
dren of immigrants.
–  Facilitating acquisition of citizenship for long-term migrants and their 
descendants.
  It remains an open question what model should be followed with regard 
to the political and economic integration of immigrants:
–  The Anglo-Saxon immigration model (i.e. Canada, Sweden, USA, UK) grants 
economic rights at entry and political rights after a reasonably short period, 
facilitating the integration of immigrants into the labour markets and subse-
quent affiliation into the receiving society.
–  The Southern European immigration (i.e. Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) 
model tends to admit or – at least – tolerates economic migrants even if they 
have no legal access to the labour market. Until recently Southern European 
countries have periodically offered regularization to irregular labour mi-
grants. At the same time this opens up a path towards citizenship. 
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–  The Northern continental European (i.e. Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands) immigration model grants rights in several steps: 
first the right of entry and of residence; later, only after assuring that the im-
migrant’s employment is not harmful to domestic labour market participants, 
economic rights are granted; and finally, when immigrants are considered to 
be sufficiently acculturated they may claim political rights through naturali-
sation.
  To maximise benefits of immigration and reduce costs of integration, 
European countries should be encouraged to give migrants legal access to their 
labour markets. Other alternatives are costly for the public coffer and have the 
unintended consequence of rather delaying than encouraging the integration 
of immigrants. However, it remains of course a crucial political question, to 
what extent European societies are willing to offer not only economic, but 
political inclusion through naturalisation and birthright citizenship for chil-
dren of immigrants born on their territory.
  More sensible quantitative research and provision of factual information 
to the public is needed on: (a) the way both high-skilled and low-skilled im-
migrant labour contributes to employment and growth in the EU by helping 
ease shortages on labour markets and thus improve their efficiency, and (b) 
the way in which free-mobility of third-country nationals residing in an EU 
Member State and/or common measures to admit economic migrants would 
help to better integrate the EU labour market, improve its efficiency and the 
competitiveness of the European economy, thus enhancing welfare gains for 
all citizens and residents of Europe.
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  Western and Central Europe1 is home or host to some 42 million inter- 
national migrants, representing about 8.9% of its total population.2 More than 
half of them have come from countries outside Western and Central Europe. 
The other 45% have moved between countries of this region. When only taking 
immigrants from third countries into account, Europe’s immigrant population 
in absolute terms is still smaller than the number of immigrants in the United 
States.3 Nevertheless, Europe has become one of the main destinations on the 
world map of international migration. From a historical perspective, this is a 
relatively new phenomenon. 
  In contrast to demographic realities, many Europeans still do not see their 
homelands as destination for immigration, nor do they assume that immigra-
tion could turn into a permanent and possibly even necessary and managed 
process. Today, this contra-factual perception of demographic realities has be-
come a major obstacle for the management of migration and the implementa-
tion of proactive migration regimes. International migration is certainly in-
creasing on a global scale, and the causes and underlying processes that have 
led to this shift from emigration to immigration in Europe are diverse. The most 
important causes are related to the considerable economic, social, and political 
imbalances that mark the gap between relatively rich, democratic, and stable 
but ageing societies in Europe and the much poorer, less stable, but youthful and 
demographically growing societies in neighbouring and other world regions.
  Despite this situation many EU Member States, so far, are characterised by 
an absence of pro-active immigration policies. Traditionally such immigration 
policies were associated with guest worker schemes implemented during 
economic boom periods or sectoral labour market shortages. More recently such 
policies also try to establish a preferential admission of high skill migrants.
  The lack of coherent pro-active migration policies is partly due to the con-
cern that immigration may lead to a burden for the treasury and worries that 
immigrants might put a downward pressure on wages and native employ-
ment. As a result, in many Western European countries, the humanitarian4 
reasons were more important for the admission of long-term migrants than the 
economic ones.
  In recent years most Western European EU countries underwent a period 
of slow economic growth. In the years 2000-2004, the EU-15’s GDP grew yearly 
by an average rate of 1.6%.5 In the new EU Member States (EU-10), however, the 
annual average growth rate was +3.2%.6 For the EU-25, this resulted in an an-
nual average growth rate of 1.7%. 
  At the same time, Europe’s native populations experience by demogra-
phic stagnation. Between 2000 and 2004, annual natural population change7 
in the EU-15 was as low as +0.1%. Most new EU Member States suffered natural 
population decline (EU-10: -0.1%). In the EU-25, natural growth amounted to 
+0.07%. As a result Western and Central Europe’s population increase (+1.5 to 
+2.1 million p.a.) was mainly driven by immigration.
  Over the last decade, Europe’s old age dependency ratio (population 65+ 
divided by population 15-65) grew constantly in the EU-25 reaching 25% in 2005.8 
Demographic ageing combined with stagnation in the numbers of gainfully 
1 | Introduction
1.1 | Scope
1   Defined as the European Economic Area (EEA) 
and Switzerland. The EEA includes EU-25, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.
2   In certain European countries official statistics 
do not give population by place of birth but by 
citizenship. Naturalised immigrants are therefore 
not always statistically “visible” and native-born 
children with foreign citizenship remain in the 
“foreigner” category if at birth they acquire solely 
their parents’ citizenship. In the decade 1992-2001 
roughly 6 million people were naturalised in the EU-
15 (see OECD/Sopemi, 2004). For a detailed analysis 
of migrants and legal foreign residents in the EU-15 
see also Münz and Fassmann (2004).
3   The comparison has to take into account that 
some 45% of Western and Central Europe’s 42 
million foreign born residents have come from 
another country of this region. In the case of the U.S. 
people moving from one state to another appear as 
internal mobility and not as international migration.
4   Admission of co-ethnic resettlers, family 
reunion, asylum seekers and refugees.
5   Source: EUROSTAT; own calculations.
6   Source: EUROSTAT; own calculations.
7   Births minus deaths.
8   Source: EUROSTAT; own calculations. A ratio of 
25% means that in 2005 there were 25 people age 
65+ per 100 persons at working age (15-64).
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employed people, as well as high unemployment rates, welled to a situation 
where the employed work force and taxpayers in general have to bear growing 
welfare and social expenditure, putting additional strain on the social security 
systems. Future projections estimate that the situation will worsen further in 
the coming decades when the baby boom generation, born in the 1950’s and 
1960’s, will reach retirement age.
  In recent debates on immigration, we can identify a paradigmatic change. 
In the past, immigration was perceived rather as a fiscal burden or even as 
a threat to national identity and social cohesion. Meanwhile, the fears have 
shifted. Many deplore a lack of integration among immigrants with different 
ethnic and religious background. Due to this perceived lack of integration in 
particular of Muslim migrant communities and the terrorist attacks in New 
York, Madrid and London, certain scepticism about immigration from Islamic 
countries has been articulated.
  At the same time the pro-active recruitment of migrants is now regarded 
by many experts and several politicians as a feasible solution to Europe’s demo-
graphic challenges. These voices expect a possible relief from strains of demo-
graphic ageing on the national labour markets and the welfare systems. Some 
even see enhanced mobility within Europe and the inflow of qualified labour 
as a means for boosting economic development.
  In the remainder of this paper we attempt to critically examine the socio-
economic theory and recent empirical evidence on the demographic and eco-
nomic impact of immigration in order to observe if the above mentioned ex-
pectations are justified. In Section 2 we discuss available data on immigration 
to Europe. Section 3 gives an overview of the socio-economic theories on the 
impact of migration. Ranging on subjects from entry, integration in the host 
society and economy, to assimilation, we discuss first short term effects on 
demography, those on the labour market, i.e. wages and employment, then 
effects on public finances (that have both short-term aspects and long-term 
implications) and finally long term effects on the balance of payments and 
growth. Following the same structure, Section 4 examines the empirical evi-
dence regarding the effects of immigration in the EU member countries. Sec-
tion 5 concludes and summarises the main policy implications.
  This paper is based on desk top research. It refers to existing literature on 
demographic, economic and labour market effects of international migration. 
The main focus is on migrant receiving countries and economies, in particular 
on EU Member States.9 From this overview and based on prior work, the authors 
of the paper draw some conclusions and policy recommendations. 
1.2 | Road Map
1.3 | Methodology
9   Other papers of this project are dealing with the 
sending countries’ perspective both overseas (Katseli 
et al., 2006) and in Central Europe (Okólski, 2006).
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  After having been primarily countries of emigration for more than two 
centuries, during the last 50 years, many parts of Europe gradually became 
destinations for international migrants. As a result the number of European 
countries with a positive migration balance has grown over the last decades. 
In many cases, the size of net migration determines whether a country still 
has population growth or is entering a stage of population decline.
  Today, all countries of Western Europe (EU-15, Norway, Switzerland) and 
a majority of the new EU Member States (EU-10) have a positive migration ba-
lance.10 It is very likely that, sooner or later, this will also be the case in most of 
the remaining countries of Europe. 
  In early 2006, the total population of Western and Central Europe, the 
Balkans and Turkey amounted 594 million. The European Union (EU-25) had 
462 million inhabitants: of these, 389 million were either citizens or foreign 
residents of the 15 pre-enlargement Member States (EU-15). The other 74 million 
were citizens or foreign residents of the ten new EU Member States (EU-10; of 
them: 73 million in Central Europe and the Baltic States [EU-8]). 106 million 
people were living in EU accession countries11 (of them: 34 million in the AC-3 
countries of the next enlargement rounds, and 72 million in Turkey), another 
12 million people in the rest of Western Europe,12 and 17 million in other West-
ern Balkan countries.13
  In 2005, Western and Central Europe still experienced a population 
increase. In the 28 EEA countries and Switzerland, total population growth 
was +2.1 million. But 11 of the 28 EEA countries (as well as three of the four EU 
accession countries14) had an excess of deaths over births. In the coming years, 
the number of countries with declining domestic population will increase. 
The other 19 countries (analysed in Table 1; Maps 1 to 3) still retain some 
natural population growth. Net migration was positive in 25 of the 33 analysed 
countries.
  Relative to population size, Cyprus15 had the largest positive migration 
balance (+27.2 per 1000 inhabitants), followed by Spain (15.0 per 1000), Ireland 
(+11.4), Austria (+7.4), Italy (+5.8), Malta (+5.0), Switzerland (+4.7), Norway (+4.7) 
and Portugal (+3.8). On the other hand, Lithuania (-3.0 per 1000 inhabitants), 
the Netherlands (-1.8), Latvia (-0.5), Poland (-0.3), Estonia (-0.3), Romania (-0.5) 
and Bulgaria (-1.8) had a negative migration balance.
  In absolute numbers for 2005, net migration was largest in Spain 
(+652,000) and Italy (+338,000), followed by the UK (+196,000), France 
(+103,000), Germany (+99,000), Portugal (+64,000), Austria (+61,000) and Ire-
land (+47,000).16 Among the new EU Member States (EU-8), the Czech Republic 
experienced the largest net migration gain (+36,000). In addition, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia also had a positive migration balance.
  Several countries, in particular the Czech Republic, Italy, Greece, Slovenia 
and Slovakia only had a population growth because of immigration. In other 
countries, for example Germany and Hungary, recent population decline 
would have been much larger without the positive migration balance. The 
EU-25, in 2005, had an overall net migration rate of +3.7 per 1,000 inhabitants 
and a net gain from international migration of +1.7 million people. This ac-
counts for almost 85% of Europe’s total population growth.
2 | Immigration to Europe: Stocks and Flows
10   Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
11   Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania (AC-3) and Turkey.
12   Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 
13   Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia 
and Montenegro (including Kosovo).
14   Excess of deaths over births in: 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania.
15   Greek part of Cyprus only.
16   Net flow of migrants (regardless of citizenship) 
according to Eurostat (Chronos data base).
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  In absolute terms, Germany has by far the largest foreign-born popula-
tion (10.1 million), followed by France (6.5 million), the UK (5.4 million), Spain 
(4.8 million) and Italy (2.5 million). Relative to the population size, two of 
Europe’s smallest countries – Luxembourg (37.4%) and Liechtenstein (33.9%) – 
have the largest stock of immigrants, followed by Switzerland (22.9%) and two 
Baltic States (Latvia 19.5% and Estonia 15.2%), Austria (15.1%), Ireland (14.1%), 
Cyprus (13.9%), Sweden (12.4%) and Germany (12.3%). In the majority of West 
European countries, the foreign-born population accounts for 7-15% of the total 
population, while in the new EU Member States in Central Europe (excluding 
the Baltic States, Cyprus and Slovenia), the share of foreign-born is still below 
5% (see Table 2; Map 4).
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3 | Impact of Immigration: Theoretical Expectations
3.1 | Demography and Ageing
  In non-agrarian economies there is no direct link between economic out-
put and population size or density. As a result medium and high income coun-
tries do not have “optimum populations” and theoretical arguments would not 
suggest actively populating regions with declining population, e.g. with mi-
grants from third countries, in order to maintain a given population size. Prob-
lems may, however, arise from rapid changes in the population structure, in 
particular from changes in the age structure. Available models and projections 
(see Figure 6) show that immigration is no remedy to demographic ageing 
caused by longevity. The main reason is that over time migrants also grow 
older. But they would have a lasting impact if they had higher fertility rates and 
would not converge to (usually lower) fertility levels of the receiving society.
  The static neo-classical model (Berry and Soligo, 1969; Borjas, 1995) pre-
dicts that market integration increases economic welfare, because labour can 
move to wherever its productivity, and thus the income workers can attain, is 
the highest. This assumes mobility from less productive to more productive 
jobs. This process will continue until marginal productivity and thus wages 
for the same work have levelled out throughout the integration area. As a 
result migration may lead to production factor price convergence between 
countries.17
  When labour migrants enter a particular receiving country, the supply 
of labour increases, i.e. the supply curve shifts, and the average market wage 
falls (see Figure 1, Step 1). Due to wage convergence between the sending and 
receiving countries, migration incentives weaken over time and migration 
flows between countries are no longer driven by national wage differentials.
  In this simple framework, the immigrants and the capital owners in the 
receiving country are net beneficiaries of migration, while native workers 
in the receiving country are net losers. However, as Borjas (2003) noted, the 
empirically measured impact of immigration on wages of native workers fluc- 
tuates from study to study and seems to cluster around zero. These findings 
contradict the neo-classical theory and put forth two major explanations. The 
first is that there are market forces at work, such as economies of scale and 
spillovers, which increase productivity and thus offset the potential down-
ward effect on wages (see Figure 1, Step 2 and 3). A second explanation is that 
of institutional factors, i.e. collective wage agreements that prevent labour 
markets from adjusting as expected.18
  There are two major approaches for analysing the wage effects of im-
migrant labour: the factor proportions approach and the area approach. The 
factor proportions approach proposed by Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1992) cal-
culates the effect of a supply shock in a market with heterogeneous labour, i.e. 
high skilled and low skilled labour, and a specific production technology. After 
assuming perfect substitution between natives and immigrants19 from the 
3.2 | Labour Market Effects
3.2.1 | Impact of Immigration on Wages
17   The main production factors are labour 
and capital; their “prices” are  wages and 
interest rates respectively.
18   However, such labour market rigidities might 
induce unemployment, if natives are displaced. Yet, 
in a dynamic setting it is possible that immigrants 
may prove complements and not substitutes to 
home labour and thus enhance employment in the 
receiving country in the long term.
19   One immigrant worker replacing exactly 
one native worker of the same skill level.
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same skill group and a certain elasticity of substitution between skilled and 
unskilled labour20 (derived from other studies), this approach calculates the 
relative effect of the supply shock on wages by comparing the receiving 
country’s actual labour supply of a particular skill group to the labour supply 
that would have been if there were no immigration. The influence of immigra-
tion on wages is dependent on the skill composition of the immigrants 
compared to that of the native work force. When it is equal, there would be 
no impact on the wage structure of the receiving country. If the immigrants 
are, however, less skilled than natives the wage of the unskilled would 
decrease and the wage of the skilled would increase. Reciprocally, if the im-
migrants are relatively more skilled than the natives, the wages of the skilled 
workers decrease and that of the unskilled increase. Therefore, the conse-
quences of immigration are dependent on the relative and not the absolute 
skill structure of the immigrants when compared with the natives of the 
receiving society. One critique of this method is that the approach does not 
estimate the effect of immigration but rather simulates it. It uses exogenous 
information on the elasticity of substitution among the skill groups to calcu-
late the relative effect of the supply shock on wages and, therefore, the results 
flowing from this approach are too sensitive to it. In addition, it may also 
suffer from the omission of certain influences such as changes in demand and 
capital inflows.
  The area approach is based on the fact that immigration is spatially 
highly concentrated. Thus, in the case that native and immigrant labour are 
substitutes, one would expect the following correlation: the higher the propor-
tion of immigrants in a particular local labour force, the lower the wages of 
natives with whom they compete.21 Empirical findings on the wage effect, 
however, vary between studies and even between different historical periods 
of the same regions. One explanation for that is that migrants are particularly 
attracted to dynamic regions where the wage growth is higher, i.e. the immi-
gration shock could be endogenous itself. Consequently, the measured impact 
on wages would be underestimated. But even when analysing truly exoge-
nous shocks,22 no effect on the natives’ outcome was found. This suggests that 
even when taking account of endogeneity, the wage effect could still be incor-
rectly estimated due the misspecification of the regression equations.
20   One skilled worker replacing more than one 
unskilled worker.
Figure 1:  
Impact of migration on wages and employment 
in receiving countries
21  This approach is seen as controversial because of 
the lack of theoretical micro-foundation.
22  The best researched event is the 1980 influx of 
Cuban immigrants in Miami (the so called Mariel 
boat lift) which increased Miami’s labour force by 
7% almost overnight.
2. Efficiency Gain 
(due to scale effects 
and/or spillovers)
Wage
1. Wage fall 
due to 
immigration
3. Wage rise 
due to increase 
in productivity
Source: Berry and Soligo, 1969; Borjas, 1995.
Natives Immigrants
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  Borjas (1999) noted that the observed changes of wages in local markets 
may be underestimated due to particular influences that are not well under-
stood and not modelled in the regression equations. Such forces could be as 
follows: the growth in local demand due to immigrant expenditures, the in-
flow of capital (in response to the increase in local demand and the rise in the 
rate of return to capital), outward migration of natives, a local reallocation of 
resources across sectors, adjustment of interregional and/or international 
trade and the real wage growth of natives due to technological change and/or 
economies of scale. Longhi et al. (2004) conclude that when such endogenous 
processes following an immigration shock occur, the wage effect will be size-
able in more closed labour markets and in the short run, when the offsetting 
factors have not had sufficient time to influence the local labour market and 
the wage structure. There is, however, no consensus on which of the adjust-
ment processes listed above might be primarily responsible for the small effect 
of an immigration shock on wages.
  Governments of migrants receiving countries use certain instruments 
such as dismissal protection, minimum wages and replacement incomes to 
protect native workers against the low-wage competition of immigrants. But 
all these are from a theoretical point of view very inefficient. On the one hand, 
the maintenance of standards makes the unskilled native workers worse off 
than they would be without government action. The wage depression in the 
presence of social standards is stronger than in their absence. On the other 
hand, high replacement incomes are inefficient since they slow down labour 
market adjustments, tend to raise unemployment in the formal sector of the 
economy, create incentives for the expansion of irregular labour markets and 
put an additional burden on the treasury.
  As an alternative, some scholars proposed wage subsidies that would 
provide supplementary income through government welfare payments if a 
person accepts to work in low paid job. The goal is that everyone works at 
whatever wage a job for him/her exists and in the sum a socially acceptable 
income is achieved from both sources. Moreover, by allowing more flexibility 
in the labour market more low-skilled jobs will be created that could meet the 
large low-skilled unemployment for both EU and third-country nationals. 
Furthermore, wages for simple jobs will not experience free-fall since at some 
point there would be more vacancies than unemployed and employers would 
compete for workers by offering higher wages (Sinn et al., 2006). Besides, if 
wage subsidies are limited to natives only they would have the advantage of 
not being eroded by welfare systems competition (Sinn, 2004).
  Another important question, beyond the impact on wages, is the follow-
ing: does immigration have a displacement effect on native labour, i.e. immi-
grants replacing natives, or does it generate an increase in the demand for la-
bour in addition to the immigrant supply effect? In the neoclassical model, 
there is no effect on unemployment since perfect price flexibility and full em-
ployment of factors are assumed. Under more realistic assumptions, common 
sense analysis is often based on the concept of “a lump of jobs”, i.e. a fixed 
number of jobs in the immigrant receiving country. If immigrants are em-
ployed then, by definition, some natives must lose their jobs (DeVoretz, 2006). 
Initially, the receiving country has no immigrants at equilibrium and full em-
3.2.2 | Impact of Immigration on Employment
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ployment of nationals with a wage of W1 (see Figure 2). Opening the labour 
market to immigrants causes the supply curve of labour to shift everywhere 
to the right (to S2), assuming a certain entry quota of foreign workers.
23 This 
labour supply shock lowers the home country’s wage to W2 and displaces part 
of the native labour. However, if these workers provide complementary hu-
man (or financial capital) and/or if economies of scale are attained, then the 
labour demand curve will shift to the right (to D2), which in turn will raise the 
wage rate and increase the demand for resident labour. In this particular case, 
the number of jobs created by the presence of immigrants just offsets the dis-
placement of jobs in the aggregate if favourable dynamic effects are incorpo-
rated. Still, we must be careful to recognise that even in this neutral case, there 
is a so-called “churning effect”. It arises since native-born workers are still 
displaced for a certain period of time and only the long-run demand effects 
compensate this initial job displacement. Furthermore, the native workers, 
who initially lost their jobs, may not be employed as a result of the latter labour 
demand curve’s shift, because they may be of a different skill level than the 
created jobs. Thus, the displaced workers will need to be retrained, which in 
turn generates costs to the treasury or to their household budget, and/or a 
higher demand for immigrant labour could be induced.
  The second part of Figure 2 presents an extreme case of nearly total dis-
placement under which the native workers initially work at a wage rate W1 
prior to the arrival of any immigrants. Given a growing demand for labour 
from D1 to D2, however, only immigrant workers would be hired since they 
would supply their labour at a lower wage WI than the native workers WN. This 
is often the case when either regular or irregular unskilled workers enter the 
receiving country’s labour market and work for a lower wage than the mar-
ginal domestic worker in this particular sector. Native workers in this case are 
not totally displaced but the sector is eventually dominated by immigrant low 
cost/low wage labour.
23   In the extreme, S
3
 would be the new supply curve 
with no immigration quota. Here the displacement 
of home labour will be complete.
Figure 2:  
Immigration impact on employment – 








































  From a theoretical point of view, a “churning effect” does not necessarily 
have to happen. Ortega (2000) presents a theoretical model for positive effects 
of immigration on natives’ wages and unemployment, in an economy with 
equilibrium unemployment, i.e. people unwilling to work at the market wage. 
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  He theorises that there are three equilibrium points. The first equilibri-
um is assumed in the absence of immigration, i.e. each worker decides to look 
for work only within his/her home country. In the second equilibrium some 
workers of the structurally weaker country seek work in the more advanced 
country. And the third occurs when all individuals in the weaker (or poorer) 
country would try to emigrate.
  The author suggests the existence of a self-fulfilling prophecy, arising 
from the matching process. The immigrants anticipate on the one hand receiv-
ing wages that are high enough to compensate for the migration costs. On the 
other hand, the employers expect to pay relatively low wages to immigrant 
workers who have had high search or migration cost. These prospects increase 
the labour demand in the receiving country and generate “pull forces” for im-
migration. Moreover, the above equilibria are Pareto-ranked, meaning that 
with the third migration equilibrium (full migration), all market actors are 
better off compared to the second equilibrium (partial migration), which in 
turn dominates the first equilibrium (no migration). Ortega concludes that in 
the specified framework, everybody gains from immigration. The employers 
benefit from the lower wages on average and are thus compensated for the 
high search costs they might bear in equilibrium. The immigrants are also 
better off as they have better employment chances in the host country and 
receive higher salaries. And the natives are also winners as the job creation 
keeps the unemployment rate low. Furthermore, they earn higher wages 
because of their better bargaining position, due to the increased labour market 
tightness. To sum up, this would be a case where the natives and the immi-
grants do not have to compete for scarce job opportunities and are therefore 
complements on the labour market, not substitutes.
  Theoretical research on the impact of immigration on the labour market 
efficiency is less extensive than that on wages and employment. Borjas (2001) 
examines whether the immigration improves the labour market efficiency by 
quickly closing the gap between the marginal products of labour in different 
regions. He assumes sizeable wage differences across regions and high migra-
tion costs (fixed for the different potentially migrating groups and higher than 
the wage gap), so that the natives are not motivated to move from one region 
to another. The capital is fixed and owned by the natives. Conversely, the new-
ly arriving migrants are self-selecting, highly responsive to the wage differen-
tials, acting income maximising and bearing the costs of migration from low 
to higher wage regions.24
  Opposite to one-region aggregate labour markets, the immigrants are 
supplements to the natives and they cluster in regions with higher wages. By 
doing so, they play an important role in reducing the wage differentials. This 
represents an efficiency gain from immigration for the receiving country, due 
to the more efficient allocation of resources and a maximising effect on GDP: 
the bigger the wage differentials – the larger the efficiency gains.
  Theories about the fiscal contribution of immigrants rely on the observa-
tion, that tax contributions from the native-born and the foreign-born reach 
3.2.3 | Impact on Labour Market Efficiency
24   Borjas (2001) finds out that the “old” migrants 
have the same behaviour as the natives.
3.3 | Immigration and the Public Finances
212006  |  Rainer Münz, Thomas Straubhaar, Florin Vadean, Nadia Vadean
The Costs and Benefits of European Immigration
maximum at midlife and are low at early and late stages of life, i.e. have a 
concave nature over the life cycle. However, the consumption of public goods 
and services has the opposite pattern, reaching minimum at midlife, i.e. has a 
convex nature over the life cycle (DeVoretz, 2006).
  In the optimistic case (Figure 3), the foreign-born contribution may be 
greater than that of the natives. There are two reasons for this: First, the 
foreign-born consumption of public goods and services on average usually 
starts at a later stage in life than that of the native-born, since the majority of 
immigrants arrive as young adults. Second, in theory the foreign-born are as-
sumed to have particular earning capacity due to positive selectivity. As a re-
sult, their taxes and social security contributions could generally exceed the 
consumption of public goods and services. The delayed use of public services 
coupled with the convex nature of public consumption over the life cycle and 
the existence of a positive discount rate, i.e. the interest rate used in discount-
ing future cash flows, lead to the conclusion that intensive foreign-born con-
sumption of public goods only occurs after retirement. In contrast, the native-
born population has intensive consumption of public goods at both the 
beginning and at the end of the life cycle. Thus, in this optimistic case, there 
is net fiscal transfer from the foreign-born to the native-born residents and an 
overall fiscal net gain from migration.25 However, this is based upon the 
assumption of high employment rates and earning capacities among immi-
grants.26
Figure 3:  
Contributions and public goods consumption  
by place of birth (native-born vs. foreign born; 
optimistic case)
Figure 4:  
Contributions and public goods consumption  
by place of birth (native-born vs. foreign born; 
pessimistic case)
25  See DeVoretz (2006).
26  For employment rates of foreign-born popula-
tions in EU-15 see Münz and Fassmann (2004).
native-born vs. foreign born; optimistic case
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  In the pessimistic case (Figure 4), the results suggest almost the opposite. 
The earning capacity of the foreign born – and in particular their contributions 
to the public coffer – is assumed to be lower compared to that of the natives. 
The reason could be either lower wages or lower employment rates, or even 
both. This would simultaneously raise their public goods consumption, e.g. 
unemployment benefits, social assistance, benefits in kind, and lower their 
tax payments. That is particularly the case if migrants are actually excluded 
from employment in major parts of the formal sector. Under these circum-
stances, the foreign-born act as a draw on the treasury and there is a financial 
transfer from the natives to the foreign-born residents; immigration creates a 
fiscal net burden.
  Given the above theoretical outcomes, Simon (1984) concluded the fol-
lowing: if additional immigrants make a positive contribution to the treasury, 
a country should continue to admit immigrants until their contribution goes 
to zero. However, as DeVoretz (2006) argues, the above static presentation has 
many limitations. In particular, researchers face the complex task of assigning 
the costs of pure public goods (public safety, military defence, foreign policy, 
etc.) on the margin to the newly arriving immigrants.
  When regarding the amount of public goods provided, theory states that 
individuals derive utility from the consumption of private goods and of a 
shared public good (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2004). Since different migrant 
communities may have different preferences for the type of public good to be 
provided, increased diversity lowers the utility of public good consumption. 
Therefore, a possible strategy for the increase of welfare during rises in ethnic 
diversity would be to provide less public goods and consequently to lower 
taxes. Thus, more of the income would be left to the residents and they would 
benefit from increasing their consumption of private goods.
  There is no consensus in international trade theory whether trade and 
migration are substitutes or complements. The role of trade was often empha-
sised as an alternative to labour movements.27 For example in a Heckscher-
Ohlin framework, when two countries are differently endowed with labour 
and capital but have similar technologies, each country has a comparative 
advantage in that sector of production in which its abundant factor is inten-
sely used. This could lead to welfare gains through an international division 
of labour. Subsequently, trade leads to convergence of goods’ prices, which im-
plies factor price equalisation. Thus, the incentives for factor movements – 
foreign direct investments and international migration – are reduced, mean-
ing that international trade, foreign direct investments and international 
migration are substitutes.
  In a Ricardian world, with countries having different technologies but 
the same factor endowments, each country specialises and exports the goods 
for which it has an advantage in productivity. If free movement of capital and 
labour is included in the model, there will be an inflow of the intensely used 
factor in the export sector and the initial comparative advantage is enhanced 
by the resulting endowment differences. International trade and factor flows 
are in this case complements.28 Models of the New Trade Theory, that account 
3.4 | Balance of Payments Effects
3.4.1 | Migration and Trade Creation
27   See Mundell (1957) and Venables (1999); 
see Layard et al. (1992) for a study on 
East-West migration in Europe.
28   See Markusen (1983).
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for increasing returns to scale, monopolistic competition as well as agglo- 
meration forces, also strongly suggest that trade and factor movements 
(including international migration) are complements.29
  Migration literature of the last decade analysing the impact of immigra-
tion on the sending and receiving countries’ trade balance suggests the same. 
It is argued that the immigrants influence bilateral trade flows in two ways. 
First, immigrants have a preference for the products of their home country, 
and secondly, immigrants can reduce the transaction costs of bilateral trade 
between their host and home countries. The first effect certainly would have 
a positive impact on the sending country’s exports. However, the second 
mechanism would affect both imports and exports of the two respective coun-
tries involved and thus, have a positive effect on both economies. 
  The mechanisms through which immigrants can reduce the transaction 
costs of bilateral trade can be broadly classified into two categories, depending 
on whether the effect of the immigration on trade is individual-specific or not. 
The first category is marked by network connections. Transaction costs are 
reduced because of individual business connections or personal contacts of the 
immigrants with their home country or other Diaspora communities in third 
countries. Under this mechanism, regardless of the immigrants’ country of 
origin, immigration would always lower the transaction costs of inter- 
national trade. The second mechanism is non-individual-specific. Transaction 
costs of bilateral trade are reduced because of the specific knowledge, brought 
by immigrants, about foreign markets and different social institutions. This 
know-how could be taken advantage of only in the case that immigrants come 
from a country with social and political institutions that are substantially 
different to those in the receiving country. Although these two mechanisms 
are not entirely exclusive, their relative importance could be identified in 
some receiving countries’ export data.
  Recent developments in network theories highlight the role of social net-
works in enforcing contracts and in overcoming inadequate information about 
trading opportunities. Rauch (1999) points out that search processes in inter-
national trade involve transaction costs that are determined between others 
due to pre-existing ties between trade partners. Rauch and Trindade (2002) 
argue that where ethnic communities are a large part of the countries’ popula-
tion, and have numerous connections across borders, they facilitate inter- 
national trade mainly by providing market information and matching. On the 
other hand, ethnic communities that are small fractions of the receiving coun-
tries’ population are close-knit and facilitate international trade primarily by 
enforcing community sanctions that deter opportunistic behaviour.
  There is substantial literature on the influence of migrants’ remittances 
on the migrant sending countries, but practically none on the impact of mi-
grants’ remittances on the migrant receiving economies. Although migrants’ 
remittances can be considered a capital drain on the receiving countries, it 
must be noted that they represent only a fraction of the added value generated 
by immigrant labour. Immigrants spend a significant portion of their income 
on necessities and accommodation. The maximum that they are able to remit 
back home, represents mere savings. However, we can assume that even these 
savings remitted can have a positive effect on the receiving country’s econo-
3.4.2 | Remittance Outflows, Competitiveness and Exports
29   See Krugman (1995) and Fujita,  
Krugman and Venables (1999).
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my in at least two ways. On the one hand remittances may finance its exports 
through the so-called “boomerang effect”. In the short run, production facili-
ties in the middle or low-income (migrant sending) countries often cannot 
meet the additional demand generated by remittances and significant parts 
of it are covered by imports. Furthermore, industrial (migrant receiving) coun-
tries profit in the long run from exports of technology too, as facilities are built 
up in developing countries.
  On the other hand, migrant remittances may have a devaluation effect 
on the exchange rate (or relieve appreciation pressures) which improves the 
migrant receiving country’s competitiveness relative to the migrant home 
country. Thus, we conclude that from a theoretical point of view, migrant re-
mittances are expected to have a positive effect on the balance of payments of 
migrant receiving countries.
  There is a wide range of economic literature analysing the effects of mi-
gration on the economic growth in sending and receiving countries. The the-
ory ranges from neo-classical static models (which explain short-term growth 
effects), to neo-classical growth models (that determine long-run growth rates 
by exogenous elements) and finally to endogenous growth models. The last 
theories were developed in the last twenty years based on the pioneering work 
of Romer (1986, 1990) and Lucas (1988) and explain long-term growth effects 
on the base of the average skill level in the economy, human capital accumula-
tion and human capital employment in research and development (R&D).30
  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) argue that there are two important dif- 
ferences between natural population growth and demographic growth result-
ing from international labour migration. The first is that – at least in relative 
terms – the population of the migrant receiving country rises and that of the 
sending country falls. Thus, every immigration effect in the host country is 
accompanied by an emigration effect in the sending country. The second dif-
ference is that the immigrants in contrast to new-borns, bring along a certain 
amount of human capital accumulated in the sending country or in a previous 
host country. This leads to an increase of the amount of human capital of the 
receiving country.31 Furthermore, immigration interacts with the savings pat-
terns of the natives as well. Domestic capital accumulation could be altered by 
the fact that natives do not care – or care much less – about the immigrants 
compared to new-borns, and consequently will save less. Similarly, natives can 
be exposed through immigration to different saving behaviours that will 
change their savings habits and domestic capital accumulation (Walz, 2001). 
All models described in this section are characterised by these particularities 
of the international migration process.
  In the static models, the growth effects of immigration are explained by 
the so-called immigration surplus. The term was coined by Borjas (1995), who 
used it to refer to the increase of the income of natives (GNP), due to immigra-
tion. When labour migrants enter a destination country the labour supply 
curve shifts and the market wage falls (from W1 to W3; Figure 5a). Domestic 
income (GDP) rises (from the area ABCD to the area ABEF; Figure 5a), but part 
of it is distributed directly to the immigrants as labour income (the area HCEF; 
Figure 5a). However, the market wage equals the productivity of the last im-
migrant hired. Thus, immigrant labour increases domestic GDP by more than 
3.5 | Immigration and Growth
30   For further literature overviews on this topic 
see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Walz (2001) 
and Drinkwater et al. (2003).
31   This means, that labour mobility implies 
some degree of capital mobility.
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what it costs to employ it. The difference is the immigration surplus (the area 
DFH; Figure 5a) and equals to the GNP rise of the migrant receiving country. 
The author further argues that the increase in production, due to immigration, 
might result in the reduction of production costs per unit and thus, increase 
the size of the immigration surplus substantially.32 When distinguishing 
between low skilled and high skilled labour, he argues that if capital is not 
taken into account as a production factor, the immigration surplus is maxi-
mised when the immigrant labour would be a complement in production for 
the native labour and not a substitute. This would be the case when the skill 
composition of the immigrants differs from that of the native workers. Finally, 
when capital is taken into account as a production factor, then skilled immi-
grant labour generates a larger immigration surplus (compared to unskilled 
immigrant labour) because of the production complementarities that exist 
between skilled labour and capital. This conclusion is reinforced, if consider-
ing the possibility that the human capital brought in by the skilled immigrant 
labour increases productivity.
32   However, immigration could lead to increased 
congestion and decreasing returns to scale because 
other factors of production remain fixed. 
Figure 5:  
The immigration surplus and the 
growth effect of social standards
  When accounting for homogenous labour, i.e. no differentiation between 
skilled and unskilled labour, the overall economic gain from migration for the 
migrant sending and the migrant receiving country taken together are given 
by the area DFG (Figure 5a). This is caused by the fact that the migrant labour 
in the receiving country has a higher productivity than in the sending coun-
try. However, the social standards granted in migrant receiving countries may 
distort demand for labour to the extent that these economic gains vanish or 
even turn into a loss. The area ABC in Figure 5b represents the economic gain 
for the two countries. Due to employment benefits, i.e. net wage plus hiring 
and firing costs, maternity allowance, and legal holiday, at a level of EB, more 
immigrants would be attracted in the receiving country than they would be 
in the absence of social benefits, i.e. a net wage of W. The additional migrants 
that move to the receiving country because of the social benefits will generate 
an economic loss that equals the area CDE (see Figure 5b). This is due to the fact 
that these additional migrants work in the receiving country at a lower net 
productivity than previously in the sending country. The overall growth effect 
in this case is given by the difference between the ABC and the CDE area and 
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the migrant receiving country, i.e. more social benefits generating a bigger 
loss.
  A convenient starting point for the study of the long-term growth effects 
of migration is the Solow-Swan model augmented by migration (Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 1995). The assumptions of the model that allows for migration 
are: free mobility of labour; the economy is closed with respect to inter- 
national trade and capital mobility; and the savings rate is exogenous, i.e. con-
stant. The long-run growth rate in the model is determined by population 
growth and exogenous technical progress. Short-term dynamics are positively 
driven by capitl per capita accumulation. Further, capital per capita accumula-
tion depends positively on the savings rate and negatively on the population 
growth. Immigration has a composite effect on capital accumulation: on the 
one hand, it reduces capital per capita in the migrant receiving country by 
increasing population, but on the other hand it increases capital per capita 
because each migrant brings a certain amount of capital. Consequently, the 
overall effect of immigration on capital accumulation depends on the relation 
between capital per capita of the resident population and the capital per capi-
ta that the immigrants bring along. Usually migrants bring with them little 
capital and so the capital per capita reducing effect dominates.33
  An extension of the model considers also human capital. If human capi-
tal per migrant is larger than human capital per capita of the native popula-
tion, than there will be a positive effect on income per capita. To summarize 
the effects: if we assume a constant immigration rate, then the welfare effect 
depends on the amount of financial and human capital migrants bring into 
the receiving country. If immigration increases the average amount of capital 
per capita, income per capita increases too. However, if migrants are endowed 
with less capital than the average native population, then immigration leads 
to a decline in the average capital per capita. Therefore, income per capita 
declines. Since this is the empirically relevant case, we can summarize that in 
the framework of the neo-classical growth model, immigration has a negative 
effect on income per capita. However, this effect is the smaller, the more capi-
tal the immigrants are endowed with.
  The assumption that human capital plays the dominant role in the deter-
mination of the long-term growth rate is central in the endogenous growth 
theory. According to Lucas’ (1988) pioneering modelling, the accumulation of 
human capital is a function of the skill level (i.e. average amount of human 
capital per person) in the economy, the effort (i.e. time) devoted to human 
capital accumulation and the efficiency in the human capital sector.34 Output 
is determined by technology, the stock of financial capital and the effective 
workforce, which includes employment, average human capital and time 
allocation, and by assuming that human capital has a positive effect on pro-
ductivity. Walz (2001), thus, identifies three possible channels through which 
migration could influence the long-term growth rate: a change of the average 
human capital in the receiving economy, a change in the efficiency of the 
human capital accumulation process and the allocation of time between 
production and human capital accumulation.
  First, immigration can directly alter the average human capital of the 
receiving economy through the so-called composition effect (Reichlin and Rus-
tichini, 1998). This means, that depending on the skilled versus unskilled ratio 
of the immigrants, the average human capital in the economy could be in-
creased or reduced. If the migrants have a higher average skill level than the 
33   The assumption, that the capital per capita of 
the resident population is higher than the capital 
immigrants are endowed with is regarded as 
plausible by most scholars; see Kyriacou (1991), 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Walz (2001).
34   There are assumed constant returns 
to the accumulation of human capital.
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natives, the average human capital in the receiving economy would be in-
creased, the accumulation of human capital improved, and this would have a 
positive effect on growth. In contrast, the composition effect would have a 
negative effect on growth, when low skilled workers enter the labour market 
of the receiving economy. However, Walz (1996) concludes, that while the op-
timal migration policy for the receiving country would be to accept only high 
skilled immigrants, this would hurt the sending countries because of the brain 
drain.
  Walz (2001) points out that immigration usually leads to more ethnic and 
cultural diversity as well. This, on its part, may reduce the knowledge spill-
overs between groups, due to higher communication costs. In a dynamic set-
ting, diversity would thus have a negative effect on the accumulation of 
human capital. However, this negative effect is always to be considered to-
gether with the positive contribution of immigration to human capital accu-
mulation. Furthermore, in the case of high skilled immigration, it is plausible 
that the positive influence dominates. In particular, as pointed out by Durkin 
(1998), highly skilled immigrants are the ones with the highest assimilation 
incentives and therefore heterogeneity would vanish over time. Hence, Walz 
(2001) concludes, that receiving countries, when formulating immigration 
policies, should consider skills and the ability of migrants to acquire human 
capital and to assimilate over cultural homogeneity.
28 HWWI Policy  |  Report No. 3  
by the HWWI Research Programme Migration – Migration Research Group
4 | Empirical Evidence: Impact of Immigration in Europe
4.1 | EU-25 Demographic and Immigration Trends
4.1.1 | European Demographic Perspectives
  Europe’s demographic situation is characterised by low fertility, an in-
creasing life expectancy, and overall by a projected shrinking of native popu-
lations in the decades to come. This contrasts with the demographic prospects 
of neighbouring regions to the south and south-east, where fertility is much 
higher, albeit declining, life expectancy is also increasing, and overall popula-
tion is projected to continue to grow at a considerable pace.
  Low fertility and increasing life expectancy in Europe both reverse the 
age pyramid, leading to a shrinking number of younger people, an ageing 
work force, and an increasing number and share of older people. According to 
Eurostat data and projections by the United Nations, Western and Central 
Europe’s 35 total population size will slightly increase during the next 20 years 
(2005: 472 million, 2025: 479 million) and start to decrease only during the 
following decades (to 462 million by 2050). However, the number of people 
between the ages of 15 and 64 would decrease from 317 million in 2005 to 302 
million (or -5%) until 2025 and to 261 million (-18%) by 2050 (Table 3).
  During the same period, in Western and Central Europe the number of 
people over 65 years of age will increase from 79 million in 2005 to 107 million 
by 2025 (+35%) and to 133 million in 2050 (+68%). As a result, the demographic 
old age dependency ratio (population 65+ divided by population 15-65) is likely 
to increase from 26% in 2005 to 35% until 2025 and 51% by 2050 (Table 3).
  The situation on the Balkans and in the European CIS countries 36 is simi-
lar to the one in the EU-25. Sustained endogenous population growth, how-
ever, is expected for Albania, Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Macedonia, Turkey (Table 7), 
and most parts of Central Asia (Table 5),37 but many Balkan countries, Russia, 
and Ukraine face considerable demographic decline (Tables 4 and 6). 
  In contrast, the situation in Europe’s southern and south-eastern neigh-
bour regions, i.e. in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA-1438 and the Gulf 
States; Tables 8 and 9) is characterised by higher – but declining – fertility, 
rising life expectancy, and sustained demographic growth. Total population 
in MENA-14 will grow steadily from 313 million in 2005 to 438 million by 2025 
(+40%) and to 557 million by 2050 (+78%). During this period, in MENA-14 the 
number of people between ages 15 and 64 will almost double: from 195 million 
in 2000 to 289 million by 2025 (+48%) and to 365 million by 2050 (+78%). At the 
same time, this region also faces an ageing problem and its population over 
age 65 will grow almost fivefold over the next 45 years (Table 8).
  The change in the economically active population, however, will be 
smaller than the projected changes for the age group 15-64, because only 60-
80% of this age group are currently employed or self-employed. Today, the size 
of Western and Central Europe’s labour force is 227 million. After 2010, this 
region (EEA and Switzerland) can expect a decrease in the active population. 
By 2025, the decrease will reach -16 million (compared to 2005; Table 3). During 
the same period (2005-2025), the active or job-seeking population will still 
rise by 7 million people in the EECA-20 (Tables 4 to 7) and by 66 million in 
MENA-14 (Table 8). In EECA-20, this increase will mainly take place in Turkey 
35   The 28 EEA countries and Switzerland.
36   EECA-20 countries in Europe are Albania, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Romania, Russian Fed., Serbia-Montenegro, Turkey, 
Ukraine.
37   EECA-20 countries in Asia are Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Rep., Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.
38  MENA-14 countries are Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, 
Syria, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen.
12. Without Kosovo.
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(Table 7) and Central Asia (Table 5). In countries such as Bulgaria, Moldova, 
Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, the active or job-seeking population is 
already shrinking.
  Throughout the 21st century, Western and Central Europe will be con-
fronted with a rapidly decreasing native work force (-44 million until 2050; 
Table 3) while the potentially active population will continue to grow in Eu-
rope’s southern and south-eastern neighbour regions (+118 million until 2050 
for MENA-14; Table 8) and in Turkey (+16 million until 2050; Table 7).
  For Europe, the main challenge is the changing ratio between economi-
cally active and retired persons, i.e. old age support ratio. With a projected em-
ployment rate of 70%, the number of employed persons per person aged 65 and 
above will decline from 2.7 in 2010 to some 2.2 in 2020 and to only 1.5 in 2040. 
If, after reaching the so-called Lisbon target, the employment rate were to rise 
further to 75% between 2010 and 2020, the decline in this ratio would be at-
tenuated, reaching 2.4 in 2020 and 1.8 in 2040.
  In North Africa and the Middle East, the main challenge is to absorb those 
currently unemployed and those entering the labour market during the next 
two decades. In order to fully cope with this challenge the MENA-14 countries 
would have to create 45 million new jobs until 2010 and more than 100 million 
until 2025, while Europe is confronted with choices concerning higher retire-
ment age, higher labour force participation of women, and the recruitment of 
immigrants. The current labour market conditions in many MENA-countries 
raise doubts whether these economies will be able to absorb the significant 
expansion of the labour force. As a consequence of persistent, large-scale un-
employment in most MENA-14 countries, migration pressures on the contract-
ing labour markets in Europe will increase.
  Economic indicators clearly reveal two observations of interest: the large 
gap between Europe and neighbouring world regions, but also the consider-
able heterogeneity within these regions. The maximum ratio of per capita in-
come between the richest European and poorest MENA-14 country is 93:1; for 
the regional per capita averages, the ratio still amounts to almost 5:1.40
  In 2005, Western and Central Europe (the EEA, and Switzerland) had 474 
million inhabitants, with an average GDP (PPP) per capita of US$ 27,306, rang-
ing in Western Europe from US$ 69,800 (Luxembourg) to US$ 19,335 (Portugal) 
and in the new EU Member States from US$ 21,911 (Slovenia) to US$ 12,622 
(Latvia). The EECA-20 region had 402 million inhabitants, with an average per 
capita GDP (PPP) of US$ 8,214, ranging from US$ 12,158 (Croatia) and US$ 7,950 
(Turkey) to a mere US$ 1,388 (Tajikistan). In 2005 the Middle East and North 
Africa were home to 313 million people, with an average per capita GDP (PPP) 
of US$ 7,371 per year. In the Gulf States, the average per capita GDP (PPP) is close 
to European levels (US$ 11,218), but the region also comprises low-income coun-
tries such as Morocco (US$ 4,503), Syria (US$ 3,847), and Yemen (US$ 751).41
  Political, ethnic, or religious conflicts exist in almost all world regions. 
But as asylum and displacement figures show, only some of these conflicts 
create migration pressure, which explains, at least partly, the annual inflow 
of some 400,000-450,000 people42 seeking asylum in Europe.43 A ranking of all 
EU+EEA, EECA, and MENA countries according to a political stability indicator 
and a rule of law indicator may serve as a proxy for the level of indivi- 
dually perceived insecurity.44 Despite all the possible imperfections in the 
constructions of such indicators, the exercise indicates differences in political 
stability, the human rights situation, and the general rule of law between 
40   At purchasing power parity (PPP).
41   Data from the IMF, World Economic Outlook 
Database, April 2006.
42   For the last 14 years, the lowest figure was 
260,100 (in 1996), the highest was 698,600 (in 1992).
43   In 2000-2003, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Russian 
Federation (in particular, Chechnya), Serbia and 
Montenegro (including Kosovo), and Turkey were the 
most important countries of origin of people seeking 
asylum in Europe. See United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (2004).
44   The expected value of the indicator across all 
countries world-wide is 0, with a standard deviation 
of 1. For further information on how the indicator is 
constructed, see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
(2003).
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Europe and neighbouring regions, with the EU countries at the top of the score, 
most Balkan and some CIS countries in the medium range, and many of the 
MENA countries in the lower segments. 
  In Europe, all 25 EU Member States are characterised by a high degree of 
political stability and a general rule of law. In contrast, the populations of se-
veral countries in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, as well as in 
North Africa and the Middle East, are confronted with some degree of political 
instability (or the prospects of such instability occurring) and no general rule 
of law. This may significantly reduce individual security and hence influence 
the decision to remain in the country of origin or to emigrate. Besides the 
economic and demographic arguments, the political and human rights im-
balance adds yet another dimension to such decisions and therefore has to be 
taken into account when considering the realities of wider Europe’s current 
and future migration flows.
  These imbalances explain why Europe is and will continue to be a major 
destination for migrants, even in times of slow economic growth, high domes-
tic unemployment in many EU countries, and growing efforts to control and 
eventually reduce the inflow of asylum seekers, as well as regular and irregu-
lar labour migrants.
  Even if economic conditions in the sending countries were to improve, 
one should not expect the economic push factors to disappear rapidly. The 
current levels of economic growth and job creation in sending countries in 
Europe’ neighbouring regions, i.e. MENA and Central Asia, and other parts of 
the world with migratory links to Europe, e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, 
are not sufficient to absorb the projected demographic growth and, in particu-
lar, the growth of the labour force in these countries. Large cohorts will try to 
enter the labour market during the coming years, while unemployment and 
underemployment are already high. One also has to bear in mind that the 
majority of migrants either do not come from the lowest-income countries, but 
rather from the middle-income countries, or they come from low-income 
countries but have a middle-class background. It seems that emigration only 
occurs once a certain level of development has been reached, which allows a 
first generation of potential emigrants to acquire the necessary means for 
leaving their home country. Therefore, a successful development process does 
not neces-sarily translate into a decrease in migration, but higher incomes 
definitely have a lasting impact on the outflow of people.45
  Coppel, Dumont and Visco (2001) note that immigration could not pro-
vide a complete solution to the budgetary problems arising due to the ageing 
of the population. The authors stress that although for the EU, particularly in 
the last decade, net migration has been the main factor contributing to popu-
lation growth, it could not offset the negative impact of the ageing society on 
the living standard and the additional budgetary expenditures. A widely 
quoted report by the United Nations (United Nations, 2000) has investigated 
the level of immigration required to achieve population objectives in selected 
countries between 1995 and the year 2050. Maintaining the size of the popula-
tion or that of the working-age population (15 to 64 years), at their highest 
levels reached in the absence of migration after 1995, would imply migration 
flows for the EU-15 that are not too different from those recorded during the 
period 1980-95. On average, almost a million net immigrants per year would 
be required to keep the EU-15 population constant over the period and slightly 
more than 1.5 million to maintain a constant working-age population. On the 
45   For an overview of current research and activities 
of relevant stakeholders on issues and causes and 
effects of international migration and international 
cooperation on migration issues, see Tamas (2003).
312006  |  Rainer Münz, Thomas Straubhaar, Florin Vadean, Nadia Vadean
The Costs and Benefits of European Immigration
other hand, in order to maintain the old-age dependency ratio at its 2000 level, 
the level of net migration required would entail an enormous increase (round 
700 million immigrants during the period 1995-2050) compared to the recent 
levels. Such a scenario is rather unrealistic and would imply not only large-
scale immigration, but also a large increase in total population (see Figure 6).
Figure 6:  
Replacement migration scenarios for the EU-15,
1995-2050
  Between 2000 and 2005 the total population of today’s 25 EU Member 
States grew on average by some 1.8 million people per year. 80% of this popula-
tion growth was driven by international migration (average net gain: +1.5 mil-
lion p.a.).46 In 2005, population growth was +2.0 million with a net gain from 
migration in the order of +1.7 million people. Of the EU-25 countries 20 had a 
positive migration balance. The only exceptions were the Baltic States, Poland 
and the Netherlands. In 2004, net migration gains were highest in Cyprus 
(+27.2‰ of total population), Spain (+15.0‰) and Ireland (+11.4‰). In countries like 
the Czech Republic, Italy and Slovenia net migration turned an excess of deaths 
over births into a positive total population change (see Table 1, Maps 1 to 3).
  In early 2006, total population of the EU-25 was 462 million. The number 
of third-country nationals living in the EU-25 is estimated to be 23.8 million 
people, or 5.2% of its population, while the foreign-born residents of the EU-25 
amount to 40.5 million people (8.8% of total population; Table 2).47 These 40.5 
million include first-generation migrants born either in another EU Member 
State or in a third country. Relative to the population size the following Mem-
ber States reported the highest share of foreign-born residents: Luxembourg 
(37.4%), Latvia (19.5%), Estonia (15.2%), Austria (15.1%), Ireland (14.1%), Cyprus 
(13.9%), Sweden (12.4%), Germany (12.3%), Belgium (11.4%) and Spain (11.1%) (see 
Table 2). The largest group of third-country nationals living in the European 
Union are Turkish citizens, around 2.4 million of whom 1.9 million live in 
Germany.48
4.1.2 | European Immigration Structure
46   For an overview of current research and activities 
of relevant stakeholders on issues and causes and 
effects of international migration and international 
cooperation on migration issues, see Tamas (2003).
47   Source: OECD (2006), UN (2006) and European 
Labour Force Survey, Eurostat; own calculations  
(see Table 2).
48   COM (2004) 508 final.
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  The key gates of entry for third-country immigrants in the EU are em-
ployment, family reunification, asylum and education. In 2001 some 40% of 
the residence permits were granted in the EU-15 for employment and another 
30% for family reunifications.49 However, on the one side these numbers do not 
account for seasonal and temporary labour migration, which is quite common 
in countries like Austria, Germany, France, Italy and Spain. On the other side, 
they do not include irregular immigration.50
  The main reasons for admission of newly arriving migrants differ sig-
nificantly between EU Member States. In some countries recent immigration 
is predominantly linked to family reunification, e.g. in Sweden (50%), France 
(40%), Denmark (36%) and Finland (33%). In contrast, employment was the 
reason of legal entry in 61% of the cases in Italy, 46% in Portugal, and 36% 
in Spain.51
  The skill structure of immigrants from third countries differs on average 
from that of people born in the EU-25 (natives and intra-EU migrants). Low 
skills are overrepresented among third country immigrants (36.0%; compared 
to 28% among those born in the EU-25; see Table 10). High skills are also slight-
ly overrepresented among third country immigrants (25% vs. 24%). Several EU 
Member States in continental Europe attract primarily low skilled immigrants. 
In France, Malta, Portugal and Spain some 40-50% of all migrants from third 
countries are low skilled. At the same time, in Austria, Belgium, France, Slo-
venia and Sweden the share of low skilled migrants from third countries is 1.5 
to 3 times higher than the share of low skilled natives and intra-EU migrants. 
In a few countries the share of highly skilled migrants from third countries is 
above EU average. This is particularly true for Denmark, Estonia, Slovakia (37-
38%), Sweden and the UK (30-31%, see Table 10). Ireland is the only country 
where the majority of third country immigrants are highly skilled (57% com-
pared to 28% of the natives and intra-EU migrants).
  Since the 1990s, irregular immigration has contributed significantly to 
the increase of the foreign-born population of countries like Greece, Italy, Por-
tugal and Spain. This has become obvious in the course of several regularisa-
tion campaigns. Most regularized immigrants are low-skilled or take up low-
skilled jobs.
  A recent synopsis of a large number of empirical studies concludes that 
the overall immigration impact on the wages of native workers is very small 
(Longhi et al., 2004). A 1% increase in the proportion of immigrants in the labour 
force lowers wages across the investigated studies by only 0.1%. However, there 
is considerable and systematic variation around the mean (see Figure 7).
  The main determinants were found to be labour market rigidities, i.e. 
firing costs, rigid wages, and business entry costs, the endogeneity considera-
tion of immigration (reverse causality: wages may have an impact on immi-
gration; immigrants are attracted to sectors and regions with higher wage 
growth), and the choice of the empirical approach used. First, the downward 
effect on wages tends to be larger in labour markets that have greater institu-
tional rigidities (as is the case in many EU-25 countries), where the adjustment 
process of labour supply and demand is hampered. Second, studies that do not 
50   Münz (2004).
51   See Employment in Europe 2003.
4.2 | Labour Market Effects of European Immigration
4.2.1 | Immigration and Wage Adjustment
49   Source: Employment in Europe 2003.
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Figure 7:  
Distribution of the wage effect sizes
control for the endogeneity of the proportion of immigrants in local markets 
are likely to underestimate the effect on wages, because migrants are attract-
ed to regions with higher wage growth. And third, across the studies in the 
sample the estimates obtained by the factor allocation approach tended to be 
closer to zero than those from the area approach.
  Another robust conclusion is that the wages of earlier immigrants 
are much more affected by new immigrants than the wages of the native 
workers. This is in line with the theoretical expectation, as recent and earlier 
immigrants tend to be closer substitutes in the labour market than recent 
immigrants and native workers. Similar results where obtained by a World 
Bank study. When simulating an increase in labour supply by 3% due to 
immigration, a decrease of 6% of the old migrants’ income was to be expected, 
while the income of the native was expected to increase by 0.4% (World 
Bank, 2005).
  Studies that identified immigrants only in terms of ethnicity or citizen-
ship, instead of country of birth and years in the receiving country, were less 
able to detect a negative impact of immigration on wages. In general, the 
degree of substitutability between particular skill groups of migrants and 
natives drives the magnitude of the effect on wages. In most of the studies for 
Europe and the USA, the average migrant is much less skilled than the average 
native. Thus, immigration had a more significant depressing effect on wages 
of low-skilled natives, due to the fact that newly arriving migrants are greater 
substitutes to them. Conversely, the average immigrant, usually low skilled in 
the US and Europe, has a positive impact on the wage of highly skilled native 
workers because they are complements rather than substitutes in production.
  The European empirical evidence shows that immigrants and natives 
are rather complements. In Italy, the inflow of foreign workers increased the 
wages of the native manual workers. This positive effect is larger for small 
firms and particularly in the North of Italy (Gavosto, Venturini and Villosio, 
1999). An increase in the number of the immigrant workers by 1% raised the 
native wages by 0.1%. The authors interpret this result in the light of the exist-
ence of labour shortages in certain jobs, which natives are unwilling to accept, 
and the existence of strong trade unions and centralised bargaining. Further, 
they estimated that immigration exceeding a certain quantitative level may 







-5,0 -2,5 0,0 2,5
Series: Estimation
Sample  1 345
Observations  345









Source: Longhi et al. (2004).
34 HWWI Policy  |  Report No. 3  
by the HWWI Research Programme Migration – Migration Research Group
impact on the wages of the native workers. Additional immigration that in-
creases the immigrants’ share to over 7.7% of total employment, 10.0% of em-
ployment in small firms or 12.2% of employment in Northern Italy, was pre-
dicted to lead to competition with natives and to a negative consequences for 
their wages.
  In the UK a recent study suggested that wages among native resident 
workers had not been affected at all by immigration. And if they were affect-
ed, they would rather have gone up (Dustman et al., 2003).
  In Spain a study covering the early 1990s concluded weak but positive 
effects of immigration on the labour market outcomes of native workers 
(Dolado et al., 1996). An OECD survey distinguished three categories of immi-
grant workers in the Spanish labour market, all three categories being comple-
ments to native workers. The first group consists of immigrants from other EU 
countries, who are on average better educated than the average Spanish work-
ers and engage in skilled jobs in labour market niches and linked to their cha-
racteristics as immigrants (language ability, cultural proximity for services to 
foreign residents). A second group consists of the highly educated non-OECD 
immigrants employed mostly in the commerce and professional service 
branches. The third group includes the majority of non-OECD immigrants, 
who, by contrast, are more concentrated in unskilled jobs. In part, they occupy 
jobs that are no longer attractive for native Spaniards, due to harsh working 
conditions and low pay, e.g. greenhouse farming, construction jobs and do-
mestic services, where virtually no natives are employed. In these jobs, im-
migrants seem to be complementary to the native labour force. However, they 
compete with each other and generate a downward pressure on the wages and 
the labour conditions in the sectors they are employed in (OECD, 2003).
  Immigration was recognised by an OECD study as a success story for the 
Greek labour market. A substantial increase in labour supply of about 10% over 
10 years – generated by immigration – has been absorbed with little detrimen-
tal effect on Greek workers’ wages. Immigrant workers in Greece tend to be 
concentrated in three particular sectors, in which they are complements to the 
natives: agriculture, household services and constructions. In the case of con-
struction, EU regional funds and the Olympic Games of 2004 in Athens have 
provided a boost to demand, causing wages to rise for both natives and foreign 
workers (OECD, 2005c).
  As often noted by scholars and the European Commission52, there is an 
unused employment potential among immigrants. This holds particularly 
true for the group of migrants from medium and low-income countries. The 
employment rates of third-country nationals (across all skill levels) are much 
lower compared to EU-citizens in 11 of the 15 pre-enlargement EU Member 
States (EU-15; see Tables 12, 13). 
  The highest differences in employment rates are recorded in the Nether-
lands (32.1% points), Sweden (27.2% points), Denmark (26% points), Belgium 
(24.9% points), Finland (22.0% points), France (19.5% points) and Germany 
(18.4% points). While employment rates for third-country nationals increased 
during the period 2000-2005, unemployment rates remained stable at 17%, 
being twice as high than those of EU-nationals (Table 12). The highest differ-
ences in unemployment rates between third-country nationals and EU- 
4.2.2 | Immigration and Employment
52   See Münz (2004), Employment in Europe 2003, 
Employment in Europe 2004, COM (2004) 508 final.
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nationals were registered in the above mentioned countries as well, but in a 
different order: Belgium 23.4% points, Finland 17.7% points, Sweden 15.7% 
points, France 15.5% points and Netherlands 13.3% points (see Tables 14, 15).53
  Furthermore, gender and the cultural background seem to be important 
determinants of employment too. Migrant women from middle and low- 
income countries are more likely than men to remain outside the labour 
market and spend most of their time at home, which makes it even more dif-
ficult for them to acquire the language skills and establish the social networks 
required to integrate into their host society.
Figure 8:  
Share of third-country (non-EU) foreign born in the 
total population and the total labour force, 2005
  For example, in 2003, immigrant women with Turkish and North African 
citizenship had the lowest employment rates in the EU-15. Their labour force 
participation rates only reached levels of 30.5% and 25.4% respectively. These 
rates represent just about half the level of national female employment and 
merely one third of the comparable male employment level. However, when 
also taking naturalised immigrants into account, the employment rates of 
women born in predominantly Muslim countries are substantially higher, 
reaching almost 40% in 2003.54 Nevertheless these rates are well below em-
ployment rates of native-born women. 
  Empirical studies analysing the immigration effects on native employ-
ment show results comparable to the effects on wages. A study on the effect of 
immigration on native employment, which analysed a sample of European 
countries, shows that the impact is rather small. A 10% increase in the immi-
grants’ share in total employment would reduce native employment rates by 0.2 
to 0.7% (Angrist and Kugler, 2003). The key issue is whether and to what extent 
foreign workers complement native workers or rather compete with them.
  In Western Europe, there are at least three categories of jobs that are 
usually avoided by natives and where the question of job displacement hardly 
arises. First, in many industrial countries dirty, difficult and dangerous 
(so called 3D) jobs are being increasingly shunned by native workers. Second, 
the current life-style of many West Europeans is sustained by a wide variety 
of low-paid service jobs (e.g. house cleaning or pizza delivery, as well as child-
care), that are taken up by immigrants. Third, the majority of natives does not 
respond to the demand of low-skilled jobs in the underground economy, which 
54   See Münz and Fassmann (2004); Employment in 
Europe 2004.
Note: Data for Germany, Italy and Luxembourg are not available. The labour force consists of the number of 
people aged 15 and over who are employed or unemployed (i.e. do not have jobs but are actively looking for 
work).
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53   Source: European Labour Force Survey, Eurostat; 
own calculations.
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in the EU countries now employs at least 10-15 million workers – many of whom 
are immigrants with an irregular status. 
  Another category of jobs, although perhaps not completely avoided by 
native workers, often suffers from seasonal shortages of labour, e.g. farming, 
road repairs and construction, hotel, restaurant and other tourism-related 
services. In the farm sector, in contrast to depriving local workers of jobs, im-
migrants redress labour scarcities and help these businesses to flourish during 
the busy seasons. Finally, the demand for skilled labour in several skill and 
knowledge intensive industries, notably in the fast-moving information tech-
nology sector, exceeds dramatically the domestic skilled labour supply (IOM, 
2005). Thus, it is not surprising that recent studies have found almost no cor-
relation between migration and domestic unemployment.
  A country specific aspect of Italy is that the internal labour mobility is 
very low, despite the large employment-unemployment and income gap be-
tween the North and the South of the country. This is due to the coexistence of 
high income per capita differential and low consumption per capita differen-
tial (leading to high cost of internal mobility) between Southern and Northern 
Italy. The immigrants however, being income-maximising, move to the areas 
with high wages and low unemployment, and thus act as complements to the 
much less mobile natives. Therefore, the immigrants have not been found to 
negatively influence the transition of natives out of or into unemployment. 
The only negative impact was for those looking for a job for the first time, in 
other words young unemployed people with no job experience (Venturini and 
Villosio, 2004).
  According to an OECD study, migration to Spain has had a relatively small 
influence on the overall labour market performance of natives so far. Neither 
high- nor low-skilled immigrants were observed to have a negative effect on 
employment of Spanish workers. High-skilled immigrants are often employed 
in skilled jobs in multinational companies or tourism, which were created 
mainly due to the presence of permanent immigrants from other EU Member 
States or due to foreign direct investment in Spain. Many other high-skilled 
immigrants are self-employed.
  Low-skilled immigrant workers are seen as complementing the Spa-
niards, insomuch that they accept jobs in which the domestic work force is no 
longer interested. In total, immigration had no major impact on the unemploy-
ment disparities within the country. However, there was a clear and signifi-
cant positive effect on the employment rate and the female labour force par-
ticipation. Employment is estimated to have increased by 27% between 1999 
and 2002 due to immigration and female participation by 10% points in 10 
years to reach 52% (OECD, 2003).
  One of the most striking observations about the Belgian labour market 
is the high unemployment rate among certain immigrant groups from middle 
and low-income countries, e.g. immigrants from Congo, Morocco and Turkey, 
and their concentration in relatively low-skilled jobs, often due to linguistic 
difficulties or to low levels of education. However, discrimination in the labour 
market is also a factor. A particular feature in the Belgian case could also be 
the high concentration of foreigners in declining sectors like coal mining and 
steel (OECD, 2005d). The findings seem to indicate that immigrants compete 
mostly with each other for available low-skilled jobs.
  Another issue related to the impact of immigration on unemployment is 
that instruments aiming to protect the workers, e.g. dismissal protection and 
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rigid wages, reduce the negative effect of immigration only in the short run. 
In the long run, however, they are likely to aggravate the negative impact of 
immigration on equilibrium native employment. This is due to the fact that 
these instruments generally reduce employment. Thus, in the presence of 
immigration the competition between immigrant and native workers for 
available jobs is sharpened (Angrist and Kugler, 2003). For example, the con-
struction industry in Germany employs large numbers of both regular and 
irregular foreign workers. In times of recession, the rigid labour market and 
the comparatively low mobility of regular German workers determine that 
they compete directly with immigrants, thus undermining their own job 
prospects (IOM, 2005).
  A Centre for Economic Policy Research report provides an analysis of pub-
lic perceptions on the way immigration affects wages and employment. The 
results suggest large differences in responses according to educational back-
ground, with the lower educated consistently overestimating the negative 
effects of immigration. There are also large differences in responses across 
European countries, some of which are associated with differences in the 
number of resident immigrants, unemployment rates, GDP per capita, and the 
number of past asylum applications. The main conclusions of the report are 
that only a factual and well-researched knowledge base can lead to immigra-
tion policies that respond optimally to the needs of a society. Furthermore, 
policy is likely to react to the voters‘ subjective perceptions which may be 
based on low levels of factual knowledge. Therefore, there is an urgent need in 
Europe for more sensible quantitative research on immigration related issues 
and provision of factual information to the public (Dustmann and Glitz, 2005).
  Many studies on European migration show that immigration plays an 
important role in improving labour market efficiency. All sectors with jobs 
avoided by natives, e.g. dirty, difficult and dangerous jobs, low-paid household 
service jobs, low-skilled jobs in the informal sector of the economy, sectors 
experiencing seasonal labour shortages, e.g. farming, road repairs and con-
struction, hotel, restaurant and other tourism-related services, are heavily de-
pendent on the labour supply of immigrants. In their absence, these sectors 
would probably not survive (IOM, 2005; OECD, 2003). Other fast growing sec-
tors, like the IT sector, experience long-term shortages that in the short-term 
cannot be met by the domestic education systems. The skills required for the 
new jobs typically differ quite substantially from those of workers who were 
made redundant. The extent to which the latter are retrained and redeployed 
depends considerably on whether other workers are available who already 
have had such training. One estimate for Western Europe claims that the skills 
gap has cost US$106 billion in lost gross domestic product (GDP) between 1998 
and 2000 (ILO, 2000). This loss would have been even higher in the absence of 
immigration.
  Another aspect of labour market efficiency is the difference in wages and 
unemployment rates between regions, due to low mobility of the natives. In 
Spain immigrants have almost no role in reducing regional unemployment 
differences. They move to regions where there are employment opportunities. 
Sometimes these opportunities exist in regions where the unemployment rate 
is low, such as in Madrid and Barcelona, and sometimes in regions where it is 
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high, like in Andalusia, thus reflecting the strong segmentation of the labour 
market (OECD, 2003).
  In Germany, however, important efficiency gains in the case of Polish 
seasonal workers were observed. They could be explained on the one hand by 
the fact there are some jobs the natives do not want, typically so far the sea-
sonal asparagus, fruit and grape harvest, and on the other hand because there 
are some occupations where the skill endowment of German workers is insuf-
ficient. In a country with strict labour market regulations, strong unions and 
persistent unemployment like Germany, immigration successfully increases 
the degree of flexibility on the labour market, decelerates wage growth and 
thus ultimately increases employment (Akkoyunlu, 2001).
  By comparatively analysing the labour markets in Western, Central and 
Eastern Europe evidence was found that immigration helps reducing the 
divergence between the sending and receiving countries, improves productiv-
ity and speeds up convergence that is beneficial for all countries involved. 
Thus, in the EU case, it seems that immigration speeds up the convergence 
process between Member States, providing gains for all EU countries (Akkoy-
unlu, 2001).
  Levine et al. (2003) examine the impact of European East-West migration 
of different skill compositions, where Central and Eastern Europe are charac-
terised by lower total factor productivity and a lower skill-unskilled labour 
ratio. They distinguish between two effects of East-West migration: an effi-
ciency effect from the more efficient use of labour in the West and a sectoral 
reallocation effect arising from the change in the skilled-unskilled wage rates. 
The first effect is explored by linking migration with the skill-unskilled labour 
ratio of the sending region, i.e. Central and Eastern Europe, and the second by 
analysing exclusively migration of skilled labour. Both types of migration re-
sult in an increase in economic growth. Furthermore, skilled-labour migration 
causes a shift out of the high-tech sector in the migrant sending regions.55 
Accordingly, these sending regions will specialise in traditional sectors and 
Western Europe‘s receiving regions in high-tech sectors. Further, the authors 
note that despite the growth gains there are winners and losers. While skilled 
migrants and skilled households in Central and Eastern Europe gain, skilled 
households in Western Europe lose. At the same time, the average Western 
household tends to gain and its counterpart in Central and Eastern Europe 
tends to lose. The main winners, however, are the migrants themselves.
  Despite the fact, that many scholars and policy makers regard immigra-
tion as an option for addressing Europe’s demographic problems, there is no 
consensus in the literature about the fiscal net contribution immigrants make 
to the treasury of the receiving country. For a long time, the concern that im-
migrants may become a fiscal burden has been a central component of the 
debate over migration policies. Further concerns were that if migration occurs 
as a result of the welfare programmes offered by Western countries, then this 
could create competition between these countries to deter migrants from en-
tering and consequently result in the erosion of the welfare state. Provisions 
such as selectively delayed integration of immigrants into the welfare system 
were adopted (Sinn and Ochel, 2003; Sinn, 2002), and countries like Ireland and 
the UK already applied them to delay welfare payments to recent immigrants 
4.3 | Immigration and the Public Finances of the EU Member States
55   Emigration from Central and Eastern Europe 
exceeding the equivalent of 5% of Western Europe‘s 
total population is estimated to have as consequence 
the disappearance of the high-tech sector from these 
sending countries (Levine et al., 2003).
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from the new EU Members States, while opening their labour markets to them 
without transitional delay.
  The European experience with immigrants’ contribution to the public 
coffer is mixed. In a number of countries such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, the Netherlands and Switzerland immigrants are apparently more de-
pendent on the welfare system than the native population. However, in seve-
ral other countries such as Germany, Greece, Portugal, Spain and UK the im-
migrants contribute similarly or even more to the treasury compared to natives 
(IOM, 2005). A Home Office study shows that immigrants make a positive net 
contribution to the UK economy (Gott and Johnston, 2002). It estimates that in 
1999/2000 immigrants in the UK paid US$ 4 billion more in taxes than they 
received in benefits. Furthermore, if intergenerational considerations are tak-
en into account, the transfers made by immigrants may be higher since the 
second generation immigrants, i.e. children of immigrants, are likely to be net 
tax payers. Similar results were presented by an ILO study. Moreover, the study 
suggests that in the absence of the immigrants’ contribution either public 
service would have to be reduced, fees increased or taxes raised (ILO, 2004).
  Germany has had very large immigrant inflows including ethnic Ger-
mans from Central Europe and CIS countries, labour migrants, asylum seekers 
and family members joining spouses or parents already living there. Germany 
also has a progressive tax structure and rather generous welfare provisions. 
Thus, the immigrant fiscal transfers ultimately depend on immigrant em-
ployment opportunities, in the case of rigid labour markets (Bevelander, 2000). 
Simon and Akbari (2000) examined the German immigrant public finance 
transfers under optimistic and pessimistic sets of assumptions, with the 
usual limitation concerning the omission of some public goods (defence, for-
eign policy, and infrastructure). They found out that around 1990, Germany’s 
foreign-born were net contributors under either set of assumptions used. 
Similar results were obtained by an ILO study covering a more recent period. 
This study stressed that 78% of immigrants in Germany are of working age 
and thus, an average immigrant makes a positive net contribution up to some 
EUR 50.000 over his/her lifetime (ILO, 2004). 
  While more modest, Sweden’s immigrant programmes give a certain 
priority to the admission of asylum seekers, refugees and other people admit-
ted for humanitarian reasons. Interestingly, around 1992 a representative 
Swedish foreign-born household head started to have a positive public transfer 
balance approximately at age 30 keeping it up until about age 65 (Gustafson 
and Osterberg, 2001). The Swedish-born household’s contribution begins at age 
25 for the male head of household, and is more distinct, but also declines to zero 
at age 65. In the same period the undiscounted transfer for the representative 
foreign-born household had a relatively small negative value of SEK -11.272 
(some US$ -1.500).56 The shape of the Swedish public transfers indicates that if 
a small public finance deficit occurs, as happened in 1992, the remedy is 
straightforward: income or labour force participation of the foreign-born must 
rise faster than those of the natives or publicly-financed consumption should 
be reduced. 
  The foreign-born public transfer results, however, are sensitive to two 
key determinants: education and residence status. If Swedish refugees had the 
minimum (or compulsory) level of education in 1992, then their public finance 
transfers would have been negative almost for their entire life. On the other 
hand, if the Swedish foreign-born residents were admitted as non-refugees 
56   In 1990 prices.
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with university education, then the public finance transfers exceed the aver-
age Swedish-born contribution by a three-fold margin. However, the refugee 
portion of the Swedish population did not make a positive transfer and this 
led to calls for the limitation on the admission of any foreign-born, including 
those from the new EU Member States (DeVoretz, 2006).
  The specific skill and origin structure of the immigrants in Spain created 
positive effects on the public finances (OECD, 2003). EU foreigners who own 
capital (usually elderly British, Dutch and German pension receivers) help in-
crease demand and contribute through direct and indirect taxes. The high 
skilled immigrants pay relatively high income taxes and have limited claims 
towards the Spanish pension and social security system. This is partly the case 
also with temporary workers, who are in the short run net contributors to the 
treasury, regardless of whether they are legally or illegally employed. Irregular 
migrants make at least indirect payments to the treasury, but their access to 
welfare benefits is limited. And even when qualified for welfare benefits they 
often do not claim them, being anxious to conceal their identity (IOM, 2005).
  In Italy, successive regularisation programmes have resulted in very 
large numbers of legalised immigrants joining the formal sector, thus widen-
ing the tax base and enhancing the social security revenue (OECD, 2005b).
  The large differences among all these findings can be explained first by 
differences in the methodology used, i.e. the benefits and contributions con-
sidered, the area of analysis, and the way the value of the services provided 
was calculated. However, the size and direction of the public finance transfers 
clearly depend on the characteristics of the immigrants: education and skills, 
age, family status and size, gate of entry and main motives for immigration, 
cultural background, etc. (IOM, 2005).
  Experience in countries like Spain has shown that skilled immigrants are 
less dependent on public welfare and that they contribute more because of hav-
ing higher incomes (OECD, 2003). Similar results were obtained by a study on 
migration and the Dutch economy: Migrants that perform better on the labour 
market than the average Dutch residents alleviate public finances over a wide 
range of ages of entry . However, non-Western immigrants turned out to be on 
average a burden to the public budget, mainly because of their low employment 
and high unemployment rates. Their low employment rates are strongly 
related to their lower educational attainment (only about 30% have higher 
secondary or tertiary education compared to over 60% of the Dutch natives). 
Discrimination and cultural factors are, however, likely to play a role too. Some 
immigrant women (in particular Muslim women) are reluctant to enter the 
labour market because of cultural reasons (Roodenburg et al., 2003).
  Family status is important as well. Young, active and single immigrants 
are less likely to depend on welfare. But the situation changes over time espe-
cially when getting married and having children. Then, welfare transfers are 
likely to increase due to additional health benefits and education for the 
children. A recent ILO study for Germany stresses the importance of the age 
factor for welfare transfers. The study shows that if an immigrant arrives at 
the age of 30, he/she will contribute EUR 110.000 over his/her lifetime. In 
contrast, a person that immigrates at birth will create a net fiscal cost of 
EUR 60.000 (ILO, 2004).
  A further issue is that non-economic migrants have more difficulties in 
economic performance and labour market integration, and provide a larger 
potential burden to the social security systems than economic migrants. 
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Recent analysis on Denmark and Germany has provided new evidence that an 
ever rising share of immigrants is unlikely to be rapidly joining the labour 
force, due to the fact that they arrive as asylum seekers or as family members 
(Constant and Zimmermann, 2005). In Germany, until 2005, only EU citizens 
and foreigners with an unlimited residence permit – which was generally 
granted after at least five years of residence in Germany or to recognised refu-
gees – did not need an additional work permit.57 All others (about one third of 
the foreign resident population), including foreign-born spouses of German 
and long-term foreign residents, did not obtain immediate labour market ac-
cess. And even when access was granted, it was initially subject to labour mar-
ket testing and bureaucratic discretion. This meant that they could only obtain 
a work permit for a particular job if neither Germans nor other EU citizens nor 
third country nationals with a privileged status were available and if no “ne-
gative effects” on the regional labour market could be expected (OECD, 2005e).58 
This highlights the importance of another factor determining the net contri-
bution of immigrants to the public coffer: the policies concerning the integra-
tion of immigrants in the receiving country’s society. 
  According to the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), 
destination countries are generally unable to take advantage of the contribu-
tion immigrants may make to the society if they are unsuccessful in effec-
tively integrating them. The Global Commission underlines that social exclu-
sion and marginalisation of migrants and their children is associated with 
particular risks and costs. In the extreme case some may retreat from society 
and look for ways of expressing their frustration, e.g. the 2005 riots in the sub-
urban ghettos of France’s major cities.
  Such situations not only represent a threat to public safety and the rule of 
law. They may also lead to negative attitudes towards migrant communities, 
place new obstacles in the way of integration and social cohesion. What par-
ticularly matters to maximise the positive contribution of immigrants are 
transparent immigration policies and the rule of law (i.e. transparency regard-
ing the admission of migrants and refugees, active involvement of both 
migrants and native citizens in the integration process, a secure legal status), 
the access to training for immigrants and their children (i.e. assistance for ac-
quiring language skills, schooling, higher education and vocational training), 
economic opportunities and non-discrimination regarding employment (i.e. 
recognition of diplomas, scope for occupational mobility and advancement), 
non-discrimination with regard to housing (i.e. avoiding ghettoisation) and last 
but not least political rights (i.e. local voting rights and access to citizenship).
  While work, education and language skills are generally considered to be 
the most important avenues of inclusion, migrant women are more likely than 
men to remain outside the labour market. For example, immigrant women 
with Turkish and North African citizenship had in 2003 the lowest employ-
ment rates in the EU-15, at levels of 30.5% and 25.4% respectively. These repre-
sent only about half the level of national female employment and almost one 
third the level of national male employment rates (European Commission, 
2004). It is thus not surprising that the Global Commission on International 
Migration underlined the need for immigration policies and integration pro-
grammes to be gender-sensitive and give special attention to the social situa-
tion and inclusion of migrant women (GCIM, 2005).
  A separate factor related to the use of public welfare is the attitude of the 
native population towards it. A general social reticence and cultural aversion 
57   On January 1st, 2005 a new German immigration 
law entered into force and removed most of these 
legal obstacles, e.g. spouses now immediately obtain 
the same labour market access as the principal 
migrant.
58   Between 1997 and 2000, asylum seekers and  
so called non deportable aliens, i.e. quasi-refugees, 
could not work in Germany, whatever their length  
of stay.
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of the host society towards public welfare dependency is likely to discourage 
immigrants from relying on it unjustifiably. However, the reverse could be 
equally true (IOM, 2005).
  In order to measure the size and direction of the relationship between 
immigration and trade, empirical studies in general use gravity models of 
trade59 augmented by immigration. Gould (1994) analysed the impact of 
immigration on trade between the US and 47 trading partners between 1970 
and 1986. He observed that exports were influenced to a greater extent by 
immigration than imports and that immigration affects rather trade in con-
sumer goods than trade in production goods. A further finding was that the 
immigrant-link effect exhausts itself as the number of immigrants increases 
over time.
  Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1996) studied the links between immigration 
and import patterns of the US for the period 1870 to 1910. They discovered a 
strong relationship between the size of the migrant cohorts and imports. 
Furthermore, they found that differences in culture and language as well as 
the possession of specialised information enabled immigrants from Asia and 
Latin America to exploit trade opportunities missed by American and nor-
thern European immigrants. However, these results come only from the study 
of imports, which are strongly affected by the preference of immigrants. Later 
studies on the receiving countries’ export pattern provide a better picture over 
the relative impact of the individual specific and non-individual specific 
mechanisms on transaction costs.
  Helliwell (1997) analysed the influence of borders on trade among Cana-
dian provinces and between Canadian provinces and US states. He observed 
effects of migration on international but not on inter-provincial trade and ex-
plained it by the fact that Canadians moving from one province to another do 
not contribute much in enhancing relevant knowledge, as their information 
about institutions and markets of their provinces are not new to the receiving 
provinces. Similar to Gould (1994) he suggested that returns from migration 
are decreasing over time and with the formation of larger Diaspora communi-
ties in the receiving country. 
  Girma and Yu (2002) examine the bilateral trade between the UK and 48 
selected trading partners by distinguishing between Commonwealth and 
non-Commonwealth countries. Their results indicate first that Britain has a 
generally higher propensity to trade with Commonwealth countries. Second, 
that there is robust evidence that immigration from non-Commonwealth 
countries has a significant trade enhancing effect. A 10% increase in the im-
migrant stock raises UK exports to those countries by 1.6%. However, the effect 
of immigration from the commonwealth countries on the UK’s exports to 
them is statistically insignificant. Thus, the findings support the idea that im-
migration increases bilateral trade through the knowledge brought by immi-
grants about foreign markets and different social institutions rather than 
their own business connections or personal contacts with the home countries. 
Third, the authors detect a pro-trade effect of immigration from non- 
Commonwealth countries, similar to other studies in the literature, but reveal 
4.4 | Immigration Effects on the Balance of Payments
4.4.1 | Immigration and Trade Creation
59   In these models, trade is assumed to be 
negatively correlated with the geographical and/ 
or cultural distance between countries. For more 
complex models see Hofmann and König (2006)
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a trade substitution effect of immigration from Commonwealth countries. 
The latter could be the result of import-substituting activities of immigrants 
from Commonwealth countries. Since the immigrant population in the UK 
from Commonwealth countries is relatively large compared to that from non-
Commonwealth countries, manufacturing activities could be more attractive 
than importing activities when there are economies of scale for production. 
On the other hand, it is argued that, in the case of the UK, since immigration 
flows into the UK are small in magnitude compared to domestic migration 
flows, the effect of decreasing returns to immigration could be avoided. 
  Blanes-Cristobal (2003) obtained similar results for the effects of Spanish 
immigration on bilateral trade with 40 partner countries for the period 1991 to 
1998. However, as an OECD study points out, trade flows between Spain and 
other EU countries have in many cases preceded the migration of people. Si-
milarly, the immigration of non-EU foreigners to Spain is still very recent, and 
largely reflects already existing cultural and economic (including trade) links, 
e.g. with Latin American countries (OECD, 2003). Thus, the direction of causal-
ity is not very clear.
  While migrants’ remittances are a steadily growing external resource of 
capital for middle and low income countries, they are in the same time a draw 
on the balance of payments of industrialised countries. As already discussed 
in this paper, to our knowledge, there is no literature on the effect of remit-
tances’ outflows on the migrant host economies. However, we expect positive 
effects in at least two ways: First, by financing the migrant receiving coun-
tries‘ exports through the so-called “boomerang effect”. In the short run, pro-
duction facilities in the middle and low income (migrant sending) countries 
often cannot meet the additional demand generated by remittances and sig-
nificant parts of it are covered by imports (from migrant receiving countries). 
And second, migrant remittances may have a devaluation effect on the ex-
change rate (or relief appreciation pressures) that improves the migrant re-
ceiving countries’ competitiveness relative to the migrant sending countries.
  According to the definition of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) mi-
grants’ remittances are reported in the balance of payments statistics under 
three categories:
–  “Compensation of Employees” (a subcategory of “Income in the Current Ac-
count”), i.e. gross earnings of workers residing abroad for less than 12 
months; 
–  “Workers’ Remittances” (a subcategory of “Current Transfers” in the “Cur-
rent Account”), i.e. the value of monetary transfers sent home by workers re-
siding abroad for more than one year; and 
–  “Migrants’ Transfers” (a subcategory of “Capital Transfers” in the “Capital 
Account”), i.e. the net wealth of migrants who move from one country of em-
ployment to another.
  Many central banks, however, do not follow the IMF’s definition and re-
port migrants’ remittances also under other categories; most commonly as 
“Other Transfers of Other Sectors”60. In its report entitled Global Economic Pros-
pects 2006 the World Bank identified a number of countries where migrants’ 
remittances fall under this category: Algeria, China, Gambia, Iran, Kenya, 
Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Serbia and Montenegro and Vietnam 
4.4.2 | The Balance of Payments Effects of Remittances Outflows
60   “Other Transfers of Other Sectors” are the 
second subcategory of private transfers besides 
Workers’ Remittances.
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(World Bank, 2005). Therefore, in the case of these countries, the World Bank 
added the category “Other Transfers of Other Sectors” to the “Compensation of 
Employees”, “Workers’ Remittances” and “Migrants’ Transfers” categories in 
order to estimate the overall size of remittance flows. However, the World 
Bank estimate does not take into account that a lot of other middle-income 
countries (e.g. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, Ukraine) and some high-income countries (e.g. Germany61 and the 
UK62) also report migrants’ remittances completely or partly under “Other 
Transfers of Other Sectors”.
  There are several problems linked to estimates of international migrants’ 
remittances flows and to comparisons between countries. 
  First of all, estimating migrants’ remittances as the sum of “Compensa-
tion of Employees”, “Workers’ Remittances” and “Migrants’ Transfers” defi-
nitely underestimates the real flows. However, by adding “Other Transfers of 
Other Sectors”,63 financial flows are included that are definitely not linked to 
workers‘ remittances, e.g. humanitarian aid from NGOs, pension payments, 
insurance and reinsurance benefits, transfers to and from investment funds 
or to and from savings accounts held in banks outside the country of residence, 
and even some transfers from illegal activities. In this study, we define remit-
tances flows as the “Compensation of Employees” plus an estimated fraction 
of the total private current transfers (i.e. the sum of “Workers’ Remittances” 
and “Other Transfers of Other Sectors”).64 Based on the analysis of the balance 
of payments statistics of numerous countries, we assume workers’ remit- 
tances to account for 50% of the private current transfers in the case of high-
income countries and for 80% of the private current transfers in the case of 
middle and low-income countries, which have less liberalised financial mar-
kets and thus less in- and outflows of other transfers.
  Second, some small industrialised countries like Luxemburg and Swit-
zerland have labour markets extending into bordering regions of neighbour-
ing countries. As a result, a considerable part of the work force consists of com-
muters residing in a neighbouring country. Consequently, these countries 
report high flows of “Compensation of Employees” going to other countries. In 
order to correct for this “cross border commuter effect”, we exclude these flows 
from the calculation of migrants’ remittances for these two countries.
  Finally, the total migrants’ remittances outflows worldwide do not 
match with the total migrants’ remittances inflows worldwide. Following the 
definition described above, in 2004 the total migrants’ remittances outflows 
worldwide amounted to US$ 225.1 billion while the total migrants’ remit- 
tances inflows worldwide amounted to US$ 278.6 billion.65 This is mainly due 
to the fact that source countries and destination countries of remittances 
count private transfers under different categories of their balance of payments 
(e.g. as a foreign investment outflow in the source country, but as a workers’ 
remittance inflow in the destination country).
  All data on migrants’ remittances, including those in this study, must be 
therefore interpreted with caution.
  In 2004, 60.5% (=US$ 135.1 billion) of migrants’ remittances were sent 
from high-income countries (see Figure 9). In the same year, according to our 
estimate 33.0% of the world’s remittances originated from the EU-15, 2.4% from 
the EU-10 and another 3.7% from other EEA countries66 and Switzerland.
  However, there is no explicit data on remittance outflows from the EU-25, 
EU-15 or EU-10. The amounts given in Figure 9 and 10 are based on the sum of 
63   As done by the World Bank (2005) for selected 
developing countries and by Straubhaar and Vadean 
(2006) for all developing countries.
64   “Migrants’ Transfers” have been disregarded in 
our calculations, because they are not explicitly 
reported in the Balance of Payments Statistics 
Yearbook. However, “Migrants’ Transfers” currently 
represent only a very small amount (US$ 1.5 billion 
in 2004; source: World Bank) in comparison to the 
estimated total remittance flows worldwide 
(US$ 225.1 billion).
65   When estimating remittances as the sum of 
“Compensation of Employees” and “Workers’ 
Remittances”, the world total amount of migrants’ 
remittance outflows for 2004 is US$ 161.6 billion, 
while the total amount of migrants’ remittance 
inflows US$ 193.7 billion. Source: IMF (2005).
66   Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.
61   The German Federal Bank reports only cash 
transfers as “Workers’ Remittances”. It further 
supplements these data with estimates on the basis 
of statistics from the German Federal Employment 
Agency on the number of employed and unemployed 
foreign nationals who are subject to social insurance 
contribution (IMF, 2005). This, however, results in a 
strong underestimation, because neither migrants 
who have entered into employment without the 
full social insurance benefits nor those who were 
naturalised in Germany are included in the statistics. 
Migrants’ remittances transferred by banks and all 
remittances of naturalised migrants are reported 
under the category “Other Transfers of Other 
Sectors”.
62   In the Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 
neither “Workers’ Remittances” nor “Other Trans- 
fers of  Other Sectors” are reported for the UK. We 
estimated the sum of the two by subtracting the 
General Government transfers from the total 
“Current Transfers”.
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remittance outflows from the respective Member States and surely over- 
estimate the actual size of total outflows, since part of these go to other EU 
Member States. However, the EU is undoubtedly one of the world’s major sour-
ces of remittances, with five of its Member States in the Top-10: Germany 
US$ 14.6 billion, United Kingdom US$ 12.3 billion, France US$ 10.6 billion, Italy 
US$ 7.4 billion, and Belgium US$ 5.5 billion (see Figure 10).
  More and better data on migrants’ remittances are needed in order to 
estimate the real size of the effects discussed here. The European Central Bank 
(ECB) would be in the best position of playing a more important role in the 
collection, correction and dissemination of remittance data for the EU Member 
States and the EU as a whole.
Figure 9: 
Source of migrants’ remittances, 2004
Figure 10:
Top 10 source countries of migrants’ remittances, 
2004
4.5 | Immigration Impact on Growth
  A World Bank report shows that the migrants’ destination country can 
enjoy significant gains from immigration. Through simulating migration 
flows which increase the labour force of all high-income countries by 3%, the 
authors demonstrate that the global income gains would be about 356 billion 
US$, from which native households in migrant receiving countries would be-
nefit in the order of 139 billion US$ (or about 0.4% of their total income; World 
Bank, 2005).67
  In the European context, estimates of a worse-case scenario of rigid wag-
es and immigration of exclusively unskilled workers show that a 1% rise in EU 
employment due to immigration could have generated income losses to the EU 
67   In the simulation model it is assumed that the 
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population in the order of 34 billion EUR or about 0.7% of the EU-15 GDP in 1993. 
However, in an optimistic scenario, in which mainly skilled workers immi-
grate and unemployment is assumed to be constant, small possible gains from 
immigration were predicted. In this case, a 1% increase of the EU labour force 
in one year, due to immigration of skilled workers only, was projected to in-
crease the income of natives by about 181 million EUR, or about 0.003% of the 
EU-15 GDP, in 1993. A similar increase in the UK and German labour force would 
have augmented the income of UK natives by about 15 million EUR, or 0.002% 
of UK‘s GDP, and the income of German natives by 32 million EUR, or 0.002% 
of the German GDP (Bauer and Zimmerman, 1999).
  These simulations also demonstrated that immigration has effects on 
the income distribution in the receiving country and that these effects could 
be quite substantial. Capital always benefits from immigration and these be-
nefits increase with the share of non-manual immigrants. Under the assump-
tion of skilled immigration equalling 1% of the native labour force, the gains 
of capital would have reached 11.5 billion EUR or 0.22% of the EU-15 GDP in 1993. 
Non-manual, native workers show a positive immigration gain as long as no 
more than 40% of the immigrants are manual. However, manual native work-
ers benefit from immigration, if more than 70% of the immigrants are non-
manual. Both types of labour could lose much through immigration, depend-
ing on the share of immigrants who substitute them. For instance, if all 
immigrants arriving in one year would equal 1% of the native work force and 
all immigrants were non-manual, non-manual native workers would lose 
0.9% of their initial income. The maximum loss for the manual native workers 
is calculated to reach 1.8% of their initial income, in the case of manual 
immigration.
  Empirical work focusing on the post World War II period gives only par-
tial support to the theoretical hypotheses of the augmented Solow-Swan mo-
del. Analyses based on regional data from the United States, Japan and five 
Western European Countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United 
Kingdom), confirm the negative effect of migration on growth rates. However, 
the results reject the positive relation between migration flows and the speed 
of convergence to the long-term growth rate (Braun, 1993; Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1995). This was explained by the fact that migration cost and adjust-
ment cost of investments slow down the convergence process (Braun, 1993). 
Dolado et al. (1994) by analysing the impact of immigration on output and 
growth in 23 OECD countries during the period 1960-1985, found evidence that 
the human capital brought in by immigrants was fairly high. And their results 
show, that this was enough to halve the negative impact of the population 
increase through immigration on output and growth. Further, as predicted by 
theory, the speed of adjustment to the steady state, i.e. long-term growth rate, 
is increased by migration. 
  The empirical analysis of the impact of European migration on the re-
ceiving and sending economies confirmed the theoretical hypotheses of the 
endogenous growth models. Straubhaar and Wolburg (1999) analysed the ef-
fects of Central and East European migration to Germany both in a neo-classi-
cal growth model and a Lucas-type endogenous growth model. First, they ob-
served that migration flows from Central and Eastern Europe increased the 
average stock of human capital in Germany by 0.65% in 1994, whereas the op-
posite effects occurred in the sending countries. As a result a classical case of 
brain drain linked to the emigration flows from Central and Eastern Europe 
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and evidence for a brain gain linked to the German immigration flows were 
ascertained. Further, the authors note that the share of high-skilled workers 
has a positive effect on the GDP in both models, i.e. the neo-classical growth 
model and the Lucas-type endogenous growth model. Moreover, Germany ex-
perienced a welfare gain from immigration of relatively high-skilled workers, 
despite of the remittances’ outflow, while the brain drain was found to be a 
burden for the sending countries even when remittances where taken into 
account (Straubhaar and Wolburg, 1999).
  The different immigrant groups in Spain were all proven to boost eco-
nomic development, but in different ways. German or British pension receiv-
ers that move to Spain for retirement contribute to development by bringing 
in financial capital. They not only consume local goods and services, but also 
have an impact on demand through the acquisition of real estate, which has 
contributed to growing real estate prices at a pace of about 30% per year be-
tween 1994 and 2002. Professionals working in the tourism sector and for mul-
tinational companies operating in Spain, although they do not own capital, 
are complementary to the investment flows in the sectors they are employed 
in. These investment flows increased the stock of capital in the Spanish eco-
nomy and are assumed to have enhanced economic growth. 
  The way in which immigrants affect productivity also depends on their 
qualification and subsequently on the type of jobs they occupy. While the 
highly-skilled European immigrants in Spain are assumed to positively in-
crease productivity, non-EU immigrants mainly occupy low-productivity jobs. 
They are estimated to have reduced labour productivity growth by 0.1 to 0.2% 
points per year. But these estimates have not taken into account the possible 
positive effects of the immigrant labour on the labour productivity of native 
workers. Besides the overall macroeconomic effect, immigration had also an 
impact on regional development. In some rural areas, the development of hor-
ticultural activities, which heavily rely on immigrant labour, has had a notice-
able effect on overall activity and regional income. It has allowed income per 
capita in some regions to catch-up with the national average, while other re-
gions have extended their lead. This is also the case in tourist regions with 
important immigration, such as the Balearic Islands (OECD, 2003).
  Regarding the international transfer of human capital, Salt (1997) noted 
that not all human capital accumulated in the sending country can be trans-
ferred offhand to the receiving country. This was often observed in Europe, 
where highly skilled immigrants took low skilled jobs in the receiving country, 
e.g. as taxi drivers or hospital staff. This so called brain waste generates re-
source costs and leaves room for questions about assimilation, integration and 
the consequences of diversity on the human capital accumulation in the re-
ceiving economy. An OECD study on Belgium observes that there integration 
does not occur, in the sense that initially poor labour market characteristics of 
quite large groups of immigrants and their descendants do not converge over 
time with the average for Belgian citizens. This appears to be caused by a com-
bination of unfavourable labour market rigidity, the reciprocal link between 
low labour market status and relatively poor school performance, and to some 
extent also due to labour market discrimination against non-European im-
migrants. Discrimination not only hinders labour market performance of im-
migrants, but by decreasing returns to human capital lowers their incentive 
to invest in host-country-specific human capital, which in turn results in 
lower labour market performance (OECD, 2005d).
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  In recent years the European Commission has intensified both research 
and recommendations in the fields of immigration, migration management 
and migrant integration. In this context particular emphasis was given to 
foreseeable demographic change in Europe and the management of interna-
tional labour migration.68 In January 2005 it adopted a Green Paper on an EU 
approach to managing economic migration69 and launched a process of in-
depth discussion on the most appropriate Community rules for admitting eco-
nomic immigrants as well as on the added value of adopting such common 
measures.
  The European Union and its Member States took important steps in build-
ing up an EU legislative framework for managing immigration flows. Two 
Directives were adopted concerning the admission of researchers70 and stu-
dents71 originating from third countries. The European Commission’s Policy 
Plan on Legal Migration72 published in December 2005 further proposed four 
Directives for the management of entry and residence of highly skilled work-
ers, seasonal workers, intra-corporate transferees, and remunerated trainees. 
With the communication on A Common Agenda for Integration73, the Commis-
sion also puts forward a framework for the integration of third-country na-
tionals in the EU labour market and society. A Directive was adopted as well, 
concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents.74 
Finally, the Commission’s Communication on Migration and Development75 
highlighted the importance of enhancing collaboration with migrant sending 
countries on economic migration and of developing initiatives offering win-
win-win opportunities to both countries of origin and destination as well as 
to labour migrants themselves. Concrete orientations were given regarding 
migrants’ remittances, collaboration with Diasporas, circular migration, and 
mitigation of the adverse effect of brain drain.
  Free movement of people is a means of creating an integrated European 
employment. Geographic mobility also avails establishing a more efficient 
labour market, to the long-term benefit of workers, employers and Member 
States. Thus, our paper recollects theoretical and empirical arguments on why 
immigration is so important, to what extent labour mobility allows individu-
als to improve their job prospects and employers to recruit people with ade-
quate skills. The paper discusses what kind of common European policies 
should be undertaken to optimise benefits of international migration. All our 
findings might help understanding the economic impact of immigration. But 
they also have policy implications for migrant receiving countries in Europe.
Demography and Ageing 
  Immigration has a positive effect on population and labour force growth. 
If natural population growth turns negative, immigration can help maintain 
the total population and the labour force constant. Immigration could also be 
a remedy to shortages of labour and skills that are unrelated to demographic 
processes. However, immigration is not a solution for tackling the consequen-
ces of demographic ageing in Europe. The level of net migration required to 
keep the old-age dependency ratio constant would demand increases of in-
flows well beyond socially desirable and politically sustainable levels.
5 | Conclusions and Policy Implications
68   See First Annual Report on Migration and 
Integration (COM[2004] 508 final); Priority actions 
for responding to the challenges of migration: First 
follow-up to Hampton Court (COM[2005] 621 final).
69   COM[2004] 811 final.
70   Council Directive 2005/71/EC.
71   Council Directive 2004/114/EC.
72   COM[2005] 669 final.
73   COM[2005] 389 final.
74   Council Directive 2003/109/EC.
75    COM[2005] 390 final.
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  Policy implications: In all EU Member States efforts will have to continue 
in implementing the employment guidelines of the new Lisbon strategy76 and 
the Stockholm recommendations77 vis-à-vis the raise of employment rates of 
older workers, reducing public debt and reforming the pension systems. Even 
when allowing for higher net immigration flows, the financial strains gene-
rated by the ageing populations in the EU will remain at considerable levels.
Labour Markets
  Empirical evidence shows that the influence on wages and employment 
is on average negative, but very small. These empirical results are suggesting, 
that the potential downward effect is offset by creation of additional employ-
ment due to economies of scale and spillovers (which increase productivity) as 
well as higher demand for goods and services (due to population growth 
through immigration).
  Compared to the US, the immigration impact on wages and employment 
was found to be more negative in EU countries. However, this negative effect is 
not evenly distributed between EU Member States. In Greece, Italy, Spain and 
the UK it turned out to be negligible or slightly positive. Immigrants appar-
ently acted as complements to native workers and competition causing down-
ward pressure on wages and job displacement hardly arose. For example, high-
skilled immigrants filled in vacancies that went unmet by the native labour 
supply and thus increased productivity, while low-skilled migrants took jobs 
avoided by natives (e.g. dirty, difficult and dangerous jobs, low paid household 
and other service jobs) and jobs in sectors that are traditionally affected by 
strong seasonal fluctuations (e.g. farming, construction, and tourism).
  Negative effects are observed in the case of Belgium, where new immi-
grants competed with immigrants who had come during earlier periods for 
available low-skilled jobs, resulting in high unemployment rates among cer-
tain foreign-born groups (e.g. Congolese, Moroccans and Turks). In Germany, 
due to the rigidity of the labour market and the comparatively low mobility of 
German workers, the labour market effects of immigration were found to be 
negative as well, in particular in the construction sector. This illustrates, that 
market regulations that have the scope to protect native workers often have 
an unintended consequence: in the long run they tend to foster the negative 
impact of immigration on the labour market situation of the natives.
  With respect to labour market efficiency, empirical evidence from se- 
veral EU countries shows that it could be improved by immigration. Since im-
migrants move to the most attractive regions, where salaries and employment 
opportunities are higher, their labour market integration induces a conver-
gence effect on wages and unemployment between regions. While at the same 
time the labour market shortages are reduced.
  Policy implications: Labour market regulations and social standards are 
often inappropriate instruments for protecting native workers against low-
wage competition by immigrants. Minimum wages and dismissal protection, 
for example, attract more immigrants than it would have been the case in the 
absence of such regulations. As a result, this may amplify unemployment and/
or wage depression. High replacement incomes have the undesired conse-
quences of raising unemployment, creating incentives for the expansion of 
irregular employment and putting an additional burden on the treasury.
  As an alternative, some scholars proposed wage subsidies that would 
provide supplementary income through government welfare payments if a 
76   COM[2005] 330 final.
77   Council of the European Union (2001).
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person accepts to work in a low paid job (Sinn et al., 2006). Furthermore, tem-
porarily delaying wage subsidies payments to recent immigrants may prevent 
EU Member States from acting as welfare magnets. Examples therefor are the 
UK and Ireland. In 2004 with the EU enlargement they opened their labour 
markets to EU labour migrants from Central Europe and the Baltic States (EU-
8). At the same time these EU-8 migrants are not entitled to similar welfare 
benefits as native workers (see Tamas and Münz, 2006).
Public Finances
  The implication of international migration on the welfare systems of EU 
Member States is diverse. Empirical evidence illustrates that the impact is 
strongly dependent upon the original “gate of entry” or way of admission, the 
labour market access and – as a result of the former – the socio-economic cha-
racteristics (labour market performance) of the immigrants. Countries with a 
high share of economic immigration, implying that immigrants have a spee-
dier access to work (e.g. UK, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain), experienced a 
positive contribution of immigrants to the treasury. In countries where im-
migration flows were dominated by asylum-seekers (who are permitted to 
work under restrictive conditions) and families reuniting (e.g. Denmark, Swe-
den) immigrants were more dependent on welfare payments than natives. 
The same occured in countries were immigrants had a low labour market per-
formance (partly due to discrimination and inappropriate access to schooling 
and training; e.g. the Netherlands). Germany partly also falls into this catego-
ry because of the large-scale admission of ethnic Germans and their depend-
ent family members who are characterised by high unemployment and high 
take-up rates of state pensions. The lowest labour market performance regis-
tered in the EU-15 in 2003 was that of immigrant women of Turkish and North 
African origin, illustrating that migrant women (in particular Muslim wom-
en) are more likely than men to remain outside the labour market, which 
makes it more difficult for them to integrate into the receiving society.
  Policy implications: A re-orientation towards a more selective immigra-
tion policy based on individual characteristics of the migrants (e.g. age, skills) 
and particular shortages identified in the receiving country would assure a 
more rapid labour market integration. As a result the migrant population 
would make positive net contributions to the public finance. This is clearly 
demonstrated by the examples of Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
  In the short run, however, admission to many EU Member States will be 
dominated by family reunion and humanitarian protection. In order to reach 
a lower dependency rate on social transfer payments for these immigrant 
groups, receiving countries should grant them access to work soon after ad-
mission.
  EU Member States need to continue their efforts of addressing the chal-
lenges of migrants‘ integration and help improving their labour market 
performance by providing language training, ameliorate their educational 
attainment, assure affordable housing and fight against discrimination and 
racism. Integration policies have to be gender-sensitive and give special atten-
tion to the social situation and inclusion of migrant women.
Balance of Payments and International Competitiveness
  Immigration has a small but positive impact on trade relations between 
migrant receiving and migrant sending counties, as shown by empirical re-
512006  |  Rainer Münz, Thomas Straubhaar, Florin Vadean, Nadia Vadean
The Costs and Benefits of European Immigration
sults from the UK and Spain. Though, the overall effect on the balance of pay-
ments of the EU Member States is uncertain.
  Immigrants (in particular seasonal and temporary workers) remit a sig-
nificant part of their income to their relatives back home. The sum of remit-
tances’ outflows from the 25 EU Member States equalled in 2004 the equiva-
lent of some US$ 49.7 billion. These capital flows represent undoubtedly a 
drain on the balance of payments, although they might support EU exports of 
goods and services too. The EU countries could improve their competitiveness 
relative to the migrant sending countries through the devaluation effect on 
the exchange rate and through the additional spending capacity generated in 
the migrant sending countries.
  To our knowledge there is no literature on the impact of remittance out-
flows on the migrant receiving countries balance of payments and their inter-
national competitiveness. The direction and size of the effect remains to be 
explored.
  Policy implications: Official data on migrants’ remittances are poor and 
difficult to compare among EU Member States, since they use different me-
thodologies of estimating these capital flows in their respective balances of 
payments. There is need for more and better data for the EU as a whole as 
well as for the individual EU Member States, both on an aggregated level and 
differentiated by country of destination. Moreover, research is necessary to 
analyse the size and direction of the impact of migrants’ remittances on the 
balance of payments and the international competitiveness of the migrant 
receiving economies in general and the EU countries in particular.
Growth
  The influence of immigration on growth was found to be positive in the 
case of immigrants endowed with financial or human capital. Immigrants 
that provide financial capital have a positive effect on consumption and 
investments. Moreover, high-skilled professionals are complementary to 
investment flows in the sectors they are employed in and thus attract more 
investments. Only the low-skilled migrants were estimated to reduce labour 
productivity in sectors that are employing them. However, low-skilled 
migrants are mostly taking jobs avoided by natives and in sectors with sea-
sonal labour shortages (e.g. farming, road repairs and construction, tourism-
related services). In particular in Southern European countries, which have 
market shortages for low-skilled labour, they not only helped these sectors to 
survive, but also contributed to their development.
  Similar to the case of welfare systems, the impact of immigration on 
growth strongly depends on the labour market performance of the migrants. 
Several European countries experienced high skilled migrants being employed 
in low skilled jobs. This so called brain waste generates resource costs and 
alerts the questions about recognition of diplomas, assimilation and integra-
tion in the migrant receiving economy. Labour market integration often does 
not occur due to a combination of rigid labour markets, the reciprocal link be-
tween low labour market status and relatively poor school performance, and 
to some extent also because of labour market discrimination against non- 
European immigrants. Discrimination not only hinders labour market perfor-
mance of immigrants, but by decreasing returns to human capital lowers their 
own incentive to invest in host-country-specific human capital, which in turn 
causes poorer labour market performance.
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  Policy implications: The EU countries experience market shortages for 
both high-skilled and low-skilled labour. The admission systems should be 
flexible and market oriented in order to help ease bottlenecks and long-term 
employment goals. However, for achieving the renewed Lisbon Strategy’s goal 
to “deliver stronger, lasting growth and create more and better jobs” much 
more has to be done. The EU Member States could take measures to improve 
the recognition of professional skills and qualification and to promote labour 
market performance of immigrants and their dependants through access to 
language tuition, promotion of “good general basic education and lifelong 
learning” (as recommended by the Stockholm Council) and non-discrimina-
tion in labour markets.
Conclusions for a European Migration Policy Approach
  Maximising benefits and minimising costs of immigration means:
–  EU Member States need to set-up flexible and market oriented admission 
systems that help ease labour market bottlenecks and long-term deficits at all 
qualification levels – from unskilled workers to highly skilled professionals. 
Attracting highly skilled migrants will be of particular importance as demon-
strated by recent legislative changes in France and the UK.
–  EU Member States ought to try attracting more high skilled migrants by 
granting long-term residence permits, facilitating access to the whole EU 
labour market, improving the recognition of professional skills and qualifica-
tions, increasing investment in R&D and a better dissemination of informa-
tion in the migrant source countries about the conditions and rights granted.
–  Non-economic migrants (families reuniting, recognized refugees and quota 
refugees, co-ethnic resettlers) should be granted speedy access to the labour 
market. More emphasis should be given to the recognition of degrees and qua-
lifications acquired prior to immigration.
–  Foreign nationals with refugee status as well as asylum seekers tolerated to 
stay for an undefined period of time need to be allowed and encouraged to 
accept jobs and to seek work at their qualification level.
–  Asylum seekers should be given preferred access to temporary or seasonal 
employment.
–  EU Member States ought to continue the efforts addressing the challenges 
of migrants’ integration (in particular non-economic migrants) and help 
improving the labour market performance of migrants by ensuring recogni-
tion of qualifications, fighting against discrimination and racism, providing 
language training and assuring affordable housing.
–  The social and labour market inclusion of migrant women should be ac-
tively promoted.
–  Labour markets should be granted a higher degree of flexibility so that the 
growing sectors can take advantage of increased productivity and thus facili-
tate job creation, while a given level of income for workers should be assured 
by wage subsidies.
–  Certain immigrants may be temporarily excluded from a particular range 
of welfare benefits to prevent the EU Member States from acting as welfare 
magnets and avoid the negative effects of the distortion of immigration pat-
terns.
–  EU Member States have to consider promoting circulation of high-skilled 
migrants by facilitating dual-citizenship and improving portability of 
rights. 
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  Special attention should be given to the integration of children with mi-
grant background (the so-called second generation). This is crucial with regard 
to the economic benefits and costs of immigration. If EU Member States are 
able to integrate well second or third generation migrants, positive contribu-
tions to the economic performance of the destination areas could be achieved. 
If failing to do so, they have to carry the financial burden of higher unemploy-
ment and lower economic success of people with migration background. As 
empirical evidence makes clear, language and schooling are the key elements 
that decide about success or failure. With regard to the conditions of an 
efficient migration policy this means:
–  Promoting school education, job training and higher education of third-
country nationals;
–  Facilitating acquisition of citizenship for long-term migrants and their 
descendants.
  Finally, it remains an open question what model should be followed with 
regard to the political and economic integration of immigrants:
–  The Anglo-Saxon immigration model (i.e. Canada, Sweden, USA, UK) grants 
economic rights at entry and political rights after a reasonably short period, 
facilitating the integration of immigrants into the labour markets and sub-
sequent affiliation into the receiving society;
–  The Southern European immigration model (i.e. Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain) tends to admit or – at least – tolerate economic migrants even if they 
have no legal access to the labour market. Until recently, Southern European 
countries have periodically offered regularization to irregular labour mi-
grants. At the same time this opens up a path towards citizenship. 
–  The Northern continental immigration model (i.e. Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands) grants rights in several steps: first the right 
of entry and of residence; later, only after assuring that the immigrant‘s em-
ployment is not unfavourable to domestic labour market participants, eco-
nomic rights are granted; and finally, when immigrants are considered to be 
sufficiently acculturated they may claim political rights through naturalisa-
tion.
  To maximise benefits of immigration and reduce costs of integration, 
European countries should be encouraged to give migrants legal access to their 
labour markets. Other alternatives are costly for the public coffer and have the 
unintended consequence of rather delaying than encouraging the integration 
of immigrants. However, it remains of course a crucial political question, to 
what extent European societies are willing to offer not only economic, but also 
a political inclusion through naturalisation and birthright citizenship for chil-
dren of immigrants born on their territory.
  More sensible quantitative research and provision of factual information 
to the public is needed on: (a) the way both high-skilled and low-skilled im-
migrant labour contributes to employment and growth in the EU by helping 
ease shortages on labour markets and thus improve their efficiency, and (b) 
the way in which free-mobility of third-country nationals residing in an EU 
Member State and/or common measures to admit economic migrants would 
help better integrate the EU labour market, improve its efficiency and the com-
petitiveness of the European economy, thus enhancing welfare gains for all 
citizens and residents of Europe.
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in 1,000 per 1,000 population in 1,000
EU-25 459,488 10.5 9.7 0.7 3.7 4.4 461,507
Austria 8,207 9.4 9.0 0.4 7.4 7.8 8,270
Belgium 10,446 11.4 10.0 1.4 3.2 4.6 10,494
Cyprus(i) 749 10.9 6.7 4.1 27.2 31.3 773
Czech Republic 10,221 10.0 10.5 -0.5 3.5 2.9 10,251
Denmark 5,411 11.8 10.3 1.6 1.4 3.0 5,428
Estonia 1,347 10.6 13.1 -2.5 -0.3 -2.8 1,343
Finland 5,237 11.0 9.2 1.8 1.7 3.5 5,255
France 60,561 12.6 8.8 3.7 1.7 5.4 60,892
Germany 82,501 8.4 10.1 -1.7 1.2 -0.5 82,456
Greece 11,076 9.4 9.2 0.2 3.1 3.3 11,112
Hungary 10,098 9.6 13.5 -3.9 1.8 -2.1 10,076
Ireland 4,109 15.3 6.5 8.8 11.4 20.2 4,193
Italy 58,462 9.9 10.4 -0.5 5.8 5.3 58,772
Latvia 2,306 9.3 14.2 -4.9 -0.5 -5.4 2,294
Lithuania 3,425 8.9 12.9 -4.0 -3.0 -7.0 3,401
Luxembourg 455 11.5 7.6 3.9 3.4 7.3 458
Malta 403 9.9 7.2 2.7 5.0 7.8 406
Netherlands 16,306 11.6 8.4 3.1 -1.2 2.0 16,338
Poland 38,174 9.4 9.7 -0.3 -0.3 -0.7 38,148
Portugal 10,529 10.5 9.7 0.8 3.9 4.7 10,579
Slovakia 5,385 10.0 9.8 0.2 0.8 0.9 5,390
Slovenia 1,998 8.8 9.2 -0.5 3.6 3.1 2,004
Spain 43,038 10.9 8.8 2.1 15.0 17.1 43,781
Sweden 9,011 10.4 9.9 0.5 2.7 3.2 9,040
UK 60,035 11.9 9.9 2.0 3.3 5.3 60,354
Acceding Countries
Bulgaria(ii) 7,761 9.0 14.6 -5.6 -1.8 -7.4 7,704
Romania(ii) 21,659 10.2 12.3 -2.1 -0.5 -2.5 21,604
Candidate Countries
Croatia 4,444 9.4 11.1 -1.7 2.6 0.9 4,448
Macedonia, FYR 2,030 : : : : 0.2 2,034
Turkey(iii) 71,609 18.9 6.2 12.6 -5.9 6.7 72,520
Other EEA and Switzerland
Iceland 294 14.2 6.2 7.9 2.0 10.0 297
Liechtenstein 35 10.8 6.4 4.5 3.8 8.3 35
Norway 4,606 12.4 8.8 3.7 4.7 8.4 4,654
Switzerland 7,415 9.6 8.3 1.3 4.7 6.0 7,460
Notes: 
(i) Greek part of Cyprus only.
(ii) EU Member State as of January 2007.
(iii) Data for Turkey on net migration are from 2003.
Source: EUROSTAT, Chronos Database; for Macedonia, FYR: World Development Indicators 2006.
Table 1 |   Demographic Indicators 2005 in Europe
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Map 1   |  Total Population Change in 2005
Europe: EU-25/EEA, Switzerland, EU Acceding and Candidate Countries
Source: EUROSTAT, Chronos Database (see Table 1).
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Map 2   |  Net Migration in 2005
Europe: EU-25/EEA, Switzerland, EU Acceding and Candidate Countries
Source: EUROSTAT, Chronos Database (see Table 1).
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Map 3   |  Demographic Change in 2005
Europe: EU-25/EEA, Switzerland, EU Acceding and Candidate Countries
Source: EUROSTAT, Chronos Database (see Table 1).
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Table 2 |   Foreign-national(i) and foreign-born(ii) population in EU-25/EEA, 
Switzerland, EU acceding and candidate countries (2005 or latest avail-
able year)
Foreign nationals Foreign born
in 1,000 % in 1,000 %
EU-25 23,837(iii) 5.2 40,501 8.8
Austria 777 9.5 1,234 15.1
Belgium 871 8.4 1,186 11.4
Cyprus (iv) 65 9.4 116 13.9
Czech Republic 254 2.5 453 4.4
Denmark 268 4.5 389 7.2
Estonia 95 6.9 202 15.2
Finland 108 2.1 156 3.0
France 3,263 5.6 6,471 10.7
Germany 6,739 8.9 10,144 12.3
Greece 762 7.0 974 8.8
Hungary 142 1.4 316 3.1
Ireland 223 5.5 585 14.1
Italy 2,402 4.1 2,519 4.3
Latvia 103 3.9 449 19.5
Lithuania 21 0.6 165 4.8
Luxembourg 177 39.0 174 37.4
Malta : : 11 2.7
Netherlands 699 4.3 1,736 10.6
Poland 49 0.1 703 1.8
Portugal 449 4.3 764 7.3
Slovakia 22 0.4 124 2.3
Slovenia 37 1.9 167 8.5
Spain 1,977 4.6 4,790 11.1
Sweden 463 5.1 1,117 12.4
United Kingdom 2,857 2.9 5,408 9.1
Acceding Countries(v)
Bulgaria 26 0.3 104 1.3
Romania 26 0.1 103 0.6
Candidate Countries
Croatia 18 0.4 661 14.5
Macedonia, FYR : : 121 5.9
Turkey 1,254 1.7 1,328 1.8
Other EEA and Switzerland
Iceland : : 23 7.3
Liechtenstein : : 12 33.9
Norway 213 4.6 344 7.4
Switzerland 1,495 20.2 1,660 22.9
Notes: 
(i) EU citizens from other Member States 
and third country nationals.
(ii) EU natives from other Member States 
and third country foreign-born.
(iii) Without Malta.
(iv) Greek part of Cyprus only.
(v) EU Member States as of January 2007. 
Source: OECD (2006), UN (2006) and 
national statistics.
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Map 4   |  Foreign-born populations in 2005
Europe: EU-25/EEA, Switzerland, EU Acceding and Candidate Countries
Source: OECD (2006), UN (2006) and national statistics (see Table 2).
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Table 3 |  Medium variant projections: demographic and labour force 
development in the EU-25(i) and other European countries(ii) by age 
group, 2005-2050 (millions)
2005 2015 2025 2050
Age group 0-14 75.6 71.4 69.6 68.6
Index 100 94 92 91
Age group 15-64 317.1 315.3 302.1 261.1
Index 100 99 95 82
Age group 65+ 78.9 91.0 106.8 132.6
Index 100 115 135 168
Total 471.7 477.7 478.6 462.2
Index 100 101 101 98
Labour force (iii) 226.7 223.4 210.5 183.3




0.25 0.29 0.35 0.51
Age group 65+/
labour force
0.35 0.41 0.51 0.72
Notes:
(i) Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Nether-
lands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
(ii) Channel Islands, Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Norway and Switzerland.
(iii) Numbers for labour force calculated by 
aggregating country data, based on national 
participation rate projections for 2005 and 
2010 over age group and sex by the ILO, and 
population projections for 2005, 2015, 2025, 
and 2050 over age group and sex by the UN, 
multiplying population projections for 
2015-2050 with participation rate 
projections of 2010.
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005, 
Holzmann and Muenz (2005).
Table 4 |   Zero-migration variant: demographic and labour force deve-
lopment in CIS – Caucasus and Eastern Europe(i) by age group, 
2005-2050 (millions)
2005 2015 2025 2050
Age group 0-14 34.7 33.2 30.5 26.2
Index 100 96 88 76
Age group 15-64 154.2 147.6 132.3 101.3
Index 100 96 86 66
Age group 65+ 30.7 28.4 34.7 40.0
Index 100 92 113 131
Total 219.5 209.2 197.5 167.5
Index 100 95 90 76
Labour force (ii) 119.0 113.0 101.4 74.9




0.20 0.19 0.26 0.40
Age group 65+/
labour force
0.26 0.25 0.34 0.54
Notes:
(i) Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova, Russian Federation, and Ukraine.
(ii) Numbers for labour force calculated by 
aggregating country data, based on national 
participation rate projections for 2005 and 
2010 over age group and sex by the ILO, and 
population projections for 2005, 2015, 2025, 
and 2050 over age group and sex by the UN, 
multiplying population projections for 
2015-2050 wih participation rate 
projections of 2010.
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005, 
Holzmann and Muenz (2005).
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Table 5 |  Zero-migration variant: demographic and labour force devel-
opment in CIS – Central Asia(i) by age group, 2005-2050 (millions)
2005 2015 2025 2050
Age group 0-14 18.0 17.8 17.6 15.1
Index 100 99 98 84
Age group 15-64 36.7 44.9 49.9 55.3
Index 100 122 136 151
Age group 65+ 3.3 3.5 5.5 12.0
Index 100 104 165 361
Total 58.0 66.1 73.0 82.4
Index 100 114 126 142
Labour force (ii) 27.0 33.5 37.5 40.3




0.09 0.08 0.11 0.22
Age group 65+/
labour force
0.12 0.10 0.15 0.30
Table 6 |  Zero-migration variant: demographic and labour force devel-
opment in the Balkans/South Eastern Europe(i) by age group,
2005-2050 (millions)
2005 2015 2025 2050
Age group 0-14 8.9 8.0 7.5 6.5
Index 100 90 84 73
Age group 15-64 36.8 36.3 33.9 26.7
Index 100 99 92 72
Age group 65+ 7.8 8.2 9.5 12.0
Index 100 105 122 153
Total 53.6 52.5 50.9 45.1
Index 100 98 95 84
Labour force (ii) 26.1 25.7 24.1 18.4




0.21 0.23 0.28 0.45
Age group 65+/
labour force
0.30 0.32 0.39 0.65
Notes:
(i) Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan, and Uzbekistan.
(ii) Numbers for labour force calculated by ag-
gregating country data, based on national par-
ticipation rate projections for 2005 and 2010 
over age group and sex by the ILO, and popula-
tion projections for 2005, 2015, 2025, and 
2050 over age group and sex by the UN, multi-
plying population projections for 2015-2050 
with participation rate projections of 2010.
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005 and 
authors’ calculations, Holzmann and Muenz 
(2005).
Notes:
(i) Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia and 
Montenegro.
(ii) Numbers for labour force calculated by ag-
gregating country data, based on national par-
ticipation rate projections for 2005 and 2010 
over age group and sex by the ILO, and popula-
tion projections for 2005, 2015, 2025, and 
2050 over age group and sex by the UN, multi-
plying population projections for 2015-2050 
with participation rate projections of 2010.
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005,
Holzmann and Muenz (2005).
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Table 7 |  Zero-migration variant: demographic and labour force deve-
lopment in Turkey by age group, 2005-2050 (millions)
2005 2015 2025 2050
Age group 0-14 21.4 21.3 20.7 18.5
Index 100 100 97 87
Age group 15-64 47.8 56.3 62.6 66.8
Index 100 118 131 140
Age group 65+ 4.0 5.1 7.7 17.3
Index 100 129 194 436
Total 73.2 82.8 91.0 102.7
Index 100 113 124 140
Labour force (i) 35.3 41.6 46.5 51.1




0.08 0.09 0.12 0.26
Age group 65+/
labour force
0.11 0.12 0.17 0.34
Notes:
(i) Numbers for labour force calculated by 
aggregating country data, based on national 
participation rate projections for 2005 and 
2010 over age group and sex by the ILO, and 
population projections for 2005, 2015, 2025, 
and 2050 over age group and sex by the UN, 
multiplying population projections for
2015-2050 with participation rate
projections of 2010.
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005, 
Holzmann and Muenz (2005).
Table 8 |  Zero-migration variant: demographic and labour force deve-
lopment in other countries of the Middle East and North Africa(i) by age 
group, 2005-2050 (millions)
2005 2015 2025 2050
Age group 0-14 104.3 115.0 120.1 116.2
Index 100 110 115 111
Age group 15-64 195.2 243.7 289.2 364.8
Index 100 125 148 187
Age group 65+ 13.7 18.1 28.5 75.6
Index 100 132 208 551
Total 313.2 376.8 437.8 556.6
Index 100 120 140 178
Labour force (ii) 118.3 154.7 183.6 236.2




0.07 0.07 0.10 0.21
Age group 65+/
labour force
0.12 0.12 0.16 0.32
Notes:
(i) Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, 
Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen.
(ii) Numbers for labour force calculated by 
aggregating country data, based on national 
participation rate projections for 2005 and 
2010 over age group and sex by the ILO, and 
population projections for 2005, 2015, 2025, 
and 2050 over age group and sex by the UN, 
multiplying population projections for 
2015-2050 with participation rate
projections of 2010.
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005, 
Holzmann and Muenz (2005).
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Table 9 |  Zero-migration variant: demographic and labour force deve-
lopment in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries(i) by age group, 
2005-2050 (millions)
2005 2015 2025 2050
Age group 0-14 12.1 12.9 13.1 11.9
Index 100 107 109 99
Age group 15-64 22.9 29.1 34.5 40.6
Index 100 127 151 177
Age group 65+ 0.9 1.4 2.9 10.1
Index 100 157 319 1.108
Total 35.9 43.4 50.6 62.6
Index 100 121 141 175
Labour force (ii) 14.7 18.4 21.4 24.9




0.04 0.05 0.08 0.25
Age group 65+/
labour force
0.06 0.08 0.14 0.41
Notes:
(i) Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
and the United Arab Emirates.
(ii) Numbers for labour force calculated by ag-
gregating country data, based on national par-
ticipation rate projections for 2005 and 2010 
over age group and sex by the ILO, and popula-
tion projections for 2005, 2015, 2025, and 
2050 over age group and sex by the UN, multi-
plying population projections for 2015-2050 
with participation rate projections of 2010.
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005,
Holzmann and Muenz (2005).
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Table 10 |  EU-25 population at working age by place of birth and level of 
education, 2005 (in percent)
Born in the EU-25 Born in a third country
Low Medium High Low Medium High
EU-25(i) 28.2 47.4 24.4 36.0 38.3 25.7
Austria 16.3 65.3 18.4 44.3 42.4 13.2
Belgium 33.5 35.5 31.1 47.5 25.6 26.9
Cyprus 33.3 39.4 27.2 36.9 31.3 31.8
Czech Republic 10.1 76.9 13.0 16.8 55.1 28.1
Denmark 16.9 50.4 32.7 26.0 35.9 38.0
Estonia 11.0 56.1 33.0 10.5 52.5 37.0
Finland 20.8 44.6 34.6 27.8 44.6 27.6
France 32.2 42.8 25.0 47.5 27.9 24.7
Germany 12.4 62.2 25.4 : : :
Greece 40.1 39.0 20.9 43.9 41.3 14.7
Hungary 24.1 59.0 16.9 13.2 62.4 24.4
Ireland 36.0 35.8 28.1 14.3 28.7 56.9
Italy 50.0 38.1 11.9 : : :
Latvia 17.0 62.1 20.9 12.1 62.6 25.3
Lithuania 13.1 60.4 26.5 7.7 65.3 27.0
Malta 74.6 13.7 11.7 50.4 26.1 23.5
Netherlands 27.6 41.2 31.3 33.6 44.0 22.3
Poland 15.4 68.1 16.5 (19.9) 58.1 22.0
Portugal 75.2 12.8 12.0 50.2 26.2 23.5
Slovakia 12.4 73.8 13.9 : (50.7) :
Slovenia 18.5 60.8 20.8 30.3 57.4 12.3
Spain 52.2 19.3 28.5 42.7 31.3 26.0
Sweden 15.8 54.7 29.5 22.4 46.4 31.3
United Kingdom 14.4 56.2 29.4 19.8 50.2 29.9
Note:
(i) Incomplete EU-25 average: education levels of EU natives do not include data for Luxembourg; 
education levels of third-country foreign-born do not include data for Germany, Italy and Luxem-
bourg. Data in brackets are of limited reliability due to the small sample size.
Source: European Labour Force Survey (LFS): ad hoc modules, Eurostat; own calculations.
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Table 11 |   EU-25 population at working age by citizenship and level of 
education, 2005 (in percent)
EU-25 nationals Third-country nationals
Low Medium High Low Medium High
EU-25(i) 25.5 49.8 24.7 47.0 35.1 17.9
Austria 17.2 64.4 18.5 49.7 40.7 9.5
Belgium 34.1 35.0 30.9 54.8 22.6 22.7
Cyprus 33.4 38.8 27.8 38.3 33.6 28.2
Czech Republic 10.1 76.9 13.0 15.4 55.4 29.2
Denmark 17.0 50.0 33.0 32.6 35.0 32.4
Estonia 10.9 55.7 33.3 (10.6) 52.8 36.6
Finland 20.9 44.6 34.5 (23.2) 45.1 31.7
France 32.6 42.1 25.3 65.0 21.4 13.7
Germany 14.7 60.2 25.1 52.3 35.0 12.7
Greece 39.9 39.2 20.9 48.7 38.5 12.8
Hungary 24.0 59.0 17.0 (12.7) 73.7 (13.6)
Ireland 35.5 35.7 28.7 (18.0) 23.8 58.1
Latvia 16.5 62.1 21.5 : (71.6) :
Lithuania 12.9 60.6 26.5 : 59.8 :
Malta 73.9 14.0 12.1 64.5 25.2 10.3
Netherlands 27.9 41.5 30.6 42.4 40.0 17.6
Poland 15.4 68.1 16.5 : (46.5) (43.5)
Portugal 74.2 13.2 12.6 47.3 36.0 (16.6)
Slovakia 12.4 73.7 13.9 : : :
Slovenia 19.5 60.5 20.0 (27.3) (55.4) :
Spain 51.4 20.2 28.4 48.7 26.1 25.2
Sweden 16.3 54.4 29.3 27.7 35.2 37.1
United Kingdom 14.8 55.6 29.6 17.1 57.1 25.9
Note:
(i) Incomplete EU-25 average: education levels of EU and third country nationals do not include 
data for Luxembourg. Data in brackets are of limited reliability due to the small sample size.
Source: European Labour Force Survey (LFS): ad hoc modules; own calculations.
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Table 12 |  Employment rates by citizenship and gender, 2000 and 2005 
(in percent) 
EU-15 nationals EU-10 and third-country nationals




67.0 73.6 60.4 55.6 66.0 45.4
Austria 69.1 75.6 62.7 60.6 70.6 50.9
Belgium 61.9 68.3 55.4 37.0 50.7 23.5
Denmark 76.3 80.5 72.0 50.3 61.1 43.4
Finland 69.5 71.1 67.8 47.5 54.9 42.1
France 64.0 69.2 59.0 44.5 59.0 30.6
Germany 66.6 72.0 61.2 48.2 58.7 37.7
Greece 59.8 73.8 46.0 68.7 85.4 50.6
Ireland 67.0 75.9 58.1 68.6 78.2 56.0
Italy : : : : : :
Luxembourg 60.9 70.5 51.0 56.9 74.3 43.7
Netherlands 74.1 80.7 67.4 42.0 54.1 30.9
Portugal 67.5 73.3 61.8 72.7 79.5 66.2
Spain 62.5 74.5 50.2 70.7 80.1 61.3
Sweden 73.5 75.3 71.6 46.3 50.3 42.8
United Kingdom 72.1 77.8 66.5 59.6 67.4 52.4
2000
EU-15(i) 65.6 73.8 57.4 50.8 62.6 38.9
Austria 68.3 77.3 59.3 70.7 82.7 57.8
Belgium 62.1 70.6 53.6 33.7 47.8 18.8
Denmark 77.1 81.3 72.9 50.0 55.3 45.3
Finland 68.4 71.3 65.4 48.1 54.2 41.8
France : : : : : :
Germany 66.3 73.4 59.2 51.2 62.1 39,.4
Greece 56.4 71.3 41.7 65.0 84.0 46.2
Ireland 64.7 76.0 53.4 49.7 56.4 41.4
Italy : : : : : :
Luxembourg 61.6 75.0 46.7 53.3 68.3 40.8
Netherlands 73.8 82.9 64.5 44.7 59.1 30.7
Portugal 68.2 76.2 60.4 72.3 76.2 67.8
Spain 56.0 71.0 41.1 60.3 75.5 46.1
Sweden 72.3 73.7 70.8 42.7 45.7 39.5
United Kingdom 71.6 78.2 65.2 54.2 64.0 46.0
Note:
(i) Incomplete EU-15 average: employment rates (2005) do not include data for Italy; employment 
rates (2000) do not include data for France and Italy.
Source: European Labour Force Survey (LFS), 2005; Eurostat.
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Table 13 |   Employment rates by place of birth and gender, 2005 (in percent) 
Born in the EU-25 Born in a third-country
Total Males Fem. Total Males Fem.
EU-25(i) 64.0 71.2 56.8 61.0 70.4 52.0
Austria 68.6 74.3 62.9 59.5 66.5 52.8
Belgium 62.4 68.7 56.0 43.6 55.7 31.9
Cyprus 67.8 79.7 56.0 75.3 77.7 73.7
Czech Republic 64.7 73.2 56.1 67.3 84.7 46.7
Denmark 76.5 80.6 72.3 57.3 68.2 49.7
Estonia 64.4 65.6 63.3 68.7 73.6 64.8
Finland 69.5 71.2 67.9 48.6 55.0 43.0
France 63.7 68.8 58.6 53.7 63.4 44.2
Germany 67.0 72.2 61.8 : : :
Greece 59.8 73.8 45.9 67.7 84.1 50.5
Hungary 56.7 62.8 50.8 64.0 73.4 55.9
Ireland 67.4 76.4 58.3 59.3 69.2 48.7
Italy 57.3 69.4 45.3 : : :
Latvia 62.3 65.6 59.3 69.1 79.3 60.4
Lithuania 62.3 65.8 59.0 73.0 82.7 64.5
Malta 53.3 73.5 33.1 61.6 73.1 48.2
Netherlands 75.0 81.4 68.4 58.7 67.6 49.7
Poland 52.3 58.2 46.5 29.4 (36.5) (22.5)
Portugal 67.2 73.1 61.4 75.0 80.1 70.4
Slovakia 57.4 64.1 50.8 67.8 : :
Slovenia 65.8 69.8 61.7 68.1 75.5 60.8
Spain 62.4 74.4 50.1 70.5 80.3 60.9
Sweden 74.5 76.2 72.7 55.3 58.8 51.9
United Kingdom 72.3 77.9 67.0 61.5 71.0 52.6
Note: 
(i) Incomplete EU-25 average: employment rates of EU natives do not include data for Luxem-
bourg; employment rates of third-country foreign-born do not include data for Germany, Italy 
and Luxembourg. Data in brackets are of limited reliability due to the small sample size.
Source: European Labour Force Survey (LFS): ad hoc modules, Eurostat; own calculations.
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Table 14 |  Unemployment rates by citizenship and gender, 2000 and 
2005 (in percent)
EU-15 nationals EU-10 and third-country nationals




7.9 7.5 8.4 17.2 16.8 17.8
Austria 4.4 4.2 4.6 13.5 13.2 13.9
Belgium 7.4 6.6 8.3 31.5 30.3 33.9
Denmark 4.7 4.1 5.3 12.8 : :
Finland 9.5 9.4 9.5 27.4 29.8 24.9
France 8.2 7.4 9.0 24.1 20.3 30.3
Germany 10.6 10.7 10.4 23.5 24.1 22.5
Greece 9.9 6.0 15.4 7.8 4.4 13.5
Ireland 4.1 4.5 3.6 6.8 6.5 7.5
Italy : : : : : :
Luxembourg 3.3 2.6 4.2 11.3 : :
Malta 7.8 7.2 9.0 6.6 5.3 8.5
Netherlands 4.5 4.2 4.9 18.1 19.8 15.3
Portugal 7.5 6.8 8.3 12.6 10.7 14.7
Spain 9.1 7.0 12.1 11.8 10.1 14.0
Sweden 8.4 8.4 8.4 24.5 27.5 21.1
United Kingdom 4.3 4.8 3.8 9.5 9.8 9.1
2000
EU-15(i) 7.7 6.7 9.1 17.0 16.9 17.3
Austria 2.9 2.4 3.5 5.5 5.3 5.8
Belgium 5.8 4.3 7.8 30.7 30.6 31.2
Denmark 4.3 3.7 5.0 13.5 : :
Finland 11.0 10.2 11.8 33.3 34.0 32.3
France : : : : : :
Germany 7.5 7.1 8.1 15.5 16.6 13.5
Greece 11.5 7.6 17.3 11.4 7.4 17.9
Ireland 4.3 4.4 4.2 : : :
Italy : : : : : :
Luxembourg 1.6 1.1 2.4 8.4 : :
Malta 6.1 6.1 6.2 17.0 18.2 15.4
Netherlands 2.6 2.0 3.3 10.1 7.9 14.0
Portugal 3.9 3.1 4.9 : : :
Spain 13.8 9.5 20.5 17.3 14.6 21.1
Sweden 5.1 5.5 4.6 22.0 20.8 23.4
United Kingdom 5.4 6.0 4.8 11.9 14.2 9.1
Note: 
(i) Incomplete EU-15 average: unemployment rates (2005) do not include data for Italy; unem-
ployment rates (2000) for EU-15 nationals do not include data for France and Italy¸ unemploy-
ment rates (2000) for third country nationals and do not include data for France, Ireland, Italy and 
Portugal.
Source: European Labour Force Survey (LFS), 2005; Eurostat.
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Table 15 |  Unemployment rates by place of birth and gender, 2005 
(in percent) 
Born in the EU-25 Born in a third-country
Total Males Fem. Total Males Fem.
EU-25(i) 6.1 6.3 5.9 8.9 9.3 8.5
Austria 3.1 3.3 3.0 8.7 10.6 6.8
Belgium 4.7 4.6 4.8 14.3 16.3 12.5
Cyprus 4.0 3.6 4.4 3.5 (4.4) (2.9)
Czech Republic 5.5 4.9 6.1 7.2 : 12.2
Denmark 3.6 3.4 3.9 7.7 (6.7) 8.4
Estonia 5.6 7.2 4.0 (7.9) : :
Finland 7.2 7.3 7.1 19.0 22.7 15.9
France 5.9 6.0 5.9 11.8 12.2 11.3
Germany 7.8 8.5 7.0 : : :
Greece 6.5 4.6 8.3 7.3 5.4 9.3
Hungary 4.4 4.7 4.0 (3.3) : (4.7)
Ireland 3.0 3.7 2.3 (4.6) (5.6) :
Italy 4.6 4.6 4.6 : : :
Latvia 6.5 7.5 5.5 5.6 : (7.3)
Lithuania 5.8 6.2 5.4 9.1 : :
Malta 4.5 5.6 3.4 7.7 9.3 5.8
Netherlands 3.2 3.1 3.2 8.1 10.1 6.0
Poland 11.7 12.3 11.2 (5.5) : :
Portugal 5.5 5.3 5.7 7.2 (7.8) (6.7)
Slovakia 11.2 12.0 10.5 : : :
Slovenia 4.0 4.2 3.8 (5.5) (3.4) (7.7)
Spain 6.2 5.6 6.8 9.3 8.7 10.0
Sweden 6.3 6.5 6.1 13.6 15.0 12.3
United Kingdom 3.3 3.9 2.6 5.3 6.0 4.5
Note: 
(i) Incomplete EU-25 average: unemployment rates of EU natives do not include data for Luxem-
bourg; unemployment rates of third-country foreign-born do not include data for Germany, Italy 
and Luxembourg. Data in brackets are of limited reliability due to the small sample size.
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